SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel, allege the following based upon the investigation of counsel, which included interviews with persons with knowledge of the conduct complained of herein and a review of United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) filings, as well as other regulatory filings, reports, advisories, press releases, and media reports. Plaintiffs believe that substantial additional evidentiary support will exist for the allegations set forth herein after an opportunity for discovery.

INTRODUCTION

1. This is a federal class action based upon the failure of defendant Eaton Vance Corp. (“Eaton Vance”), and those of its subsidiaries and affiliates also named herein as defendants, to disclose excessive fees and commissions they siphoned from Eaton Vance mutual fund investors in order to improperly pay and induce brokers to steer investors into Eaton Vance mutual funds. As a result of their material omissions and conduct detailed below, defendants are liable under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Investment Advisers Act”); the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “Investment Company Act”); New York General Business Law §349; unjust enrichment; and, for breaches of their common law fiduciary duties to a class (the “Class”) of all persons or entities who held one or more shares of Eaton Vance mutual funds, set forth in Exhibit A hereto (the “Eaton Vance Funds” or the “Funds”), during the period January 30, 1999 to November 17, 2003 (the “Class Period”).
2. In essence, defendants made undisclosed payments to brokers to induce them to direct investors into Eaton Vance Funds. Then, once invested in one or more of the Eaton Vance Funds, the investors in Eaton Vance Funds were charged and paid undisclosed fees to the defendants that were improperly used by the defendants to pay brokers to push Eaton Vance Funds on yet more investors in order to increase the level of investments in Eaton Vance Funds.

3. Defendants’ practice of charging excessive fees and commissions to Eaton Vance Funds investors to pay and induce brokers to steer investors into the Eaton Vance Funds necessarily created insurmountable conflicts of interest for the brokers who were purportedly acting in the best interests of their clients – but in fact were only concerned with their pay-offs from Eaton Vance.

4. The practice of charging excessive fees and commissions also created an insurmountable conflict of interest for the investment advisers to the Eaton Vance Funds who had a duty to act in the best interests of fund investors, but were, in fact, only concerned with siphoning fees from Eaton Vance Fund investors to induce brokers to artificially increase the sale of shares of Eaton Vance Funds. Eaton Vance was motivated to engage in this undisclosed plan of charging excessive fees to induce brokers to steer investors into Eaton Vance Funds because the fees it collected for managing and advising the Eaton Vance Funds were calculated as a percentage of assets under management, and, therefore, tended to increase as the number of Eaton Vance Funds investors grew.

5. In actions to date against the brokerage firm Morgan Stanley and the mutual fund company Massachusetts Financial Services Co., the SEC has condemned these practices stating that they create insurmountable, undisclosed conflicts of interest in violation of the securities
laws. The actions of the Eaton Vance defendants described herein are no different from those already condemned by the SEC.

6. Defendants purposefully omitted disclosing any of the improper excessive fees and commissions passed on to plaintiffs and other members of the Class. The defendants concealed such fees used to induce brokers to push Eaton Vance Funds as they realized that the inducements created an insurmountable conflict of interest significant to any reasonable person deciding how to invest his or her money. As summed up by William Galvin, the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, who is currently investigating the conflicts of interest created by Eaton Vance’s wrongful conduct:

   While few would be surprised to learn that a used car salesman would put you in a lemon for an extra two hundred buck commission, how many people know their broker might be doing the same thing? You would think that investors have a right to know this goes on. We sure do.

http://www.state.ma.us/sec/sct/sctpdf/mspr071403.pdf.

7. As described by Sen. Peter Fitzgerald (R-Ill.) in a January 28, 2004 Los Angeles Times article about a Senate committee hearing on mutual funds, the mutual fund industry “is indeed the world’s largest skimming operation,” tantamount to “a $7-trillion trough exploited by fund managers, brokers and other insiders.”

8. The truth about Eaton Vance finally emerged on November 17, 2003, when the SEC and the National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) fined and sanctioned the brokerage house Morgan Stanley DW, Inc. (“Morgan Stanley”) for, among other wrongdoing, accepting defendants’ impermissible payments in exchange for aggressively pushing Eaton Vance Funds over other funds. The SEC stated that “this matter arises from Morgan Stanley DW’s failure to disclose adequately certain material facts to its customers...[namely that] it
collected from a select group of mutual fund complexes amounts in excess of standard sales loads and Rule 12b-1 trail payments.” The SEC concluded that such conduct violated Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”), among other statutes, that prohibits one from obtaining money or property “by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.”


9. In the NASD news release announcing the action it had taken against Morgan Stanley regarding, among other wrongdoing, the improper payments Morgan Stanley had received from Eaton Vance, the NASD likewise stated the following:

[t]his extra compensation paid to Morgan Stanley for the preferential treatment included millions of dollars paid by the mutual funds through commissions charged by the firm for trades it executed for the funds. These commissions were sufficiently large to pay for the special treatment, as well as the costs of trade execution.

The NASD then concluded that the payments at issue here violated NASD Rule 2830 that prohibits the type of directed brokerage paid by Eaton Vance.

This conduct violates NASD’s Anti-Reciprocal Rule, Conduct Rule 2830(k), which prohibits members from favoring the distribution of shares of particular mutual funds on the basis of brokerage commissions to be paid by the mutual fund companies.

http://www.nasdr.com/news/pr2003/release_03_051.html; see also NASD Rule 2830(k).

**JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

10. The claims asserted herein arise under and pursuant to Sections 34(b), 36(a), 36(b) and 48(a) of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§80a-33(b), 80a-35(a) and (b) and 80a-47(a), Sections 206 and 215 of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. §§80b-6 and 80b-15, CPLR §349 and the common law.

12. Many of the acts charged herein, including the failure to disclose the excessive fees and commissions that defendants improperly siphoned from Eaton Vance Funds investors, occurred in substantial part in this District. Defendants conducted other substantial business within this District and many Class members reside within this District. For example, defendant OrbiMed Advisors LLC (“OrbiMed”) was at all relevant times, and still is, headquartered in this District. Additionally, the Eaton Vance portfolios in which the Eaton Vance Funds invest are organized as trusts under the laws of the State of New York.

13. In connection with the acts alleged in this complaint, defendants, directly or indirectly, used the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, including, but not limited to, the mails, interstate telephone communications, and the facilities of the national securities markets.

PARTIES

Plaintiffs

14. Plaintiff Stephen R. Alexander held during the Class Period shares or units of the Eaton Vance Worldwide Health Sciences Fund and has been damaged by the conduct alleged herein.

15. Plaintiff Paul Bellikoff held during the Class Period, and continues to hold, shares or units of the Eaton Vance Information Age Fund and has been damaged by the conduct alleged herein. On or about November 4, 2003, the Eaton Vance Information Age Fund changed its name to the Eaton Vance Global Growth Fund. A copy of Mr. Bellikoff’s verification is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
16. Plaintiff Marvin Goldfarb held during the Class Period shares or units of the Eaton Vance California Municipals Fund and has been damaged by the conduct alleged herein.

17. Plaintiff Phyllis Ann Jaffee Revocable Trust held during the Class Period shares or units of the Eaton Vance Worldwide Health Sciences Fund and has been damaged by the conduct alleged herein.

18. Plaintiff Igor Lukashevich held during the Class Period, and continues to hold, shares or units of the Eaton Vance Worldwide Health Sciences Fund and has been damaged by the conduct alleged herein. A copy of Mr. Lukashevich’s verification is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

19. Plaintiff John B. Perkins held during the Class Period, and continues to hold, shares or units of the Eaton Vance Worldwide Health Sciences Fund and has been damaged by the conduct alleged herein. A copy of Mr. Perkins’ verification is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

20. Plaintiff Rita Silvermetz held during the Class Period, and continues to hold, shares or units of Eaton Vance Tax Managed Growth Fund and has been damaged by the conduct alleged herein.

Nominal Defendants

The Eaton Vance Funds

21. Nominal defendants the Eaton Vance Funds (“Eaton Vance Funds”), as identified in the list annexed hereto as Exhibit A, are series of various Eaton Vance business trusts organized under the laws of the State of Massachusetts. Each trust has a board of trustees responsible for the trust’s administration. Each of the Eaton Vance Funds is an open-end management investment company, or mutual fund, in which investors contribute cash for the purpose of creating a pool of assets with which to invest and purchase securities. The Eaton
Vance Funds offer multiple classes of shares, with each class representing a *pro rata* interest in each Eaton Vance Fund. Eaton Vance Funds shares are issued to Eaton Vance Funds investors pursuant to Prospectuses that must comply with the federal securities laws, including the Investment Company Act.

22. During the Class Period, the Eaton Vance Funds utilized a two-tiered structure in which funds with substantially identical investment objectives ("Feeder Funds") pooled their assets by investing in common portfolios (herein referred to as the "Master Funds" or "Eaton Vance Portfolios"). Nominal defendants Eaton Vance Funds are Feeder Funds. The Eaton Vance Master Funds in which the Eaton Vance Funds invested during the Class Period are trusts organized under the laws of the State of New York and are purportedly separate registered investment companies. Each Eaton Vance Master Fund (except funds managed by defendants Lloyd George Investment Limited or OrbiMed identified below) entered into an investment advisory agreement with defendants Eaton Vance Management or Boston Management Research. Each Portfolio’s investment adviser, with the aid of the Portfolio Manager, invests the Portfolio’s assets in stocks or other securities, consistent with the investment goals and objectives of the individual Eaton Vance Fund. Each Eaton Vance Portfolio has a board of trustees charged with the overall management and supervision of the Eaton Vance Portfolio. Often, an Eaton Vance Fund and its corresponding Portfolio share the same trustees.

23. The SEC has referred to such a Master-Feeder structure as a "hub-and-spoke" structure. In an April 15, 1992 letter from SEC Chairman Richard C. Breeden to U.S. Representative John D. Dingell (the "Breeden Letter"), the "hub-and-spoke" structure, employed by mutual fund complexes such as Eaton Vance, is described in the following terms:

The phrase "hub-and-spoke" refers to a two-tiered arrangement in which one or more collective investment vehicles with
substantially identical investment objectives pool their assets by investing in a single investment company having the same investment objective. [...] The hub fund invests in portfolio securities (e.g., money market instruments, tax free municipal bonds, equities) in accordance with the investment objectives in its registration statement. The hub's portfolio is managed by an investment adviser like other open-end investment companies. The hub sells its shares to the spoke funds only, and therefore has no distribution costs. [...] The spoke fund invests exclusively in shares of the hub fund. The spoke needs no investment adviser, and pays no advisory fees. The spoke typically offers its shares to the public, thereby incurring distribution costs just like ordinary funds.

Breeden Letter at 3. Here, the "hubs" are the Eaton Vance Portfolios and the "spokes" are the Eaton Vance Funds. In the same letter, the SEC advised Chairman Dingell that the SEC's Division of Investment Management has treated the hub and spoke funds as functionally one entity and that the hub-and-spoke structure does not insulate any parties at the hub level from responsibility for, e.g., misstatements or omissions in the spoke fund's disclosure documents or proxy solicitations.

24. For most Eaton Vance Funds, each Fund invests its shareholders' assets in a single, corresponding Portfolio, often with a very similar name. For example, the Eaton Vance Worldwide Health Sciences Fund invests its assets in the Eaton Vance Worldwide Health Sciences Portfolio, a purportedly separate registered investment company with the same objective and policies as the Fund. In other words, in the Eaton Vance Fund complex, there is, more often than not, a one-for-one correlation between the Fund ("spoke") and the Portfolio ("hub"). Such a structure thus practically doubles the number of purportedly distinct corporate entities involved in managing shareholders' assets without providing corresponding benefits to shareholders. For the foregoing reasons, each Eaton Vance Fund and its corresponding Eaton Vance Portfolio are alter-egos of one another and should be treated as a single unit.

Consequently, because the Master and Feeder Funds are essentially alter-egos of one another that
act as one unitary organization, the Investment Advisers to the Master Funds had fiduciary duties to the Feeder Funds and their shareholders. This is evidenced by the fact that shareholders of the Feeder Funds are impacted by Investment Adviser decisions made for the Master Funds.

25. An additional reason all the Eaton Vance Funds, and their corresponding portfolios, are essentially alter egos of one another is that the Eaton Vance Funds are mainly pools of investor assets that are managed and administered by officers and employees of Eaton Vance and its subsidiaries, not by Fund employees who are independent of Eaton Vance. As detailed above, the Eaton Vance Funds share common Boards of Directors. Officers and employees of Eaton Vance and its subsidiaries administer the Eaton Vance Funds and Portfolios generally, and are not limited to individual Eaton Vance Funds. Individual Eaton Vance Funds have no independent will and are totally dominated by Eaton Vance and the common body of directors established by Eaton Vance. In substance, the Eaton Vance Funds function as components of one unitary organization.

26. All Eaton Vance Funds share Eaton Vance Management, Boston Management Research, OrbiMed or Lloyd George Management as their investment adviser and share Eaton Vance Distributor as their principal underwriter and distributor. Additionally, Eaton Vance pools together fees and expenses collected from the Eaton Vance Funds investors, resulting in the Eaton Vance Funds sharing expenses with one another. For instance, the January 1, 2003 Statement of Additional Information ("SAI") for the Eaton Vance Worldwide Health Sciences Fund is identical in substance to the SAIs filed by other Eaton Vance Funds during the Class Period. The Eaton Vance Worldwide Health Sciences Fund SAI describes in the following terms how costs for research services, alleged herein to be excessive, are commingled and shared by the various Funds:
Any particular Research Service obtained through a broker-dealer may be used by the investment adviser in connection with client accounts other than those accounts which pay commissions to such broker-dealer. Any such Research Service may be broadly useful and of value to the investment adviser in rendering investment advisory services to all or a significant portion of its clients, or may be relevant and useful for the management of only one client’s account or of a few clients’ accounts, or may be useful for the management of merely a segment of certain clients’ accounts, regardless of whether any such account or accounts paid commissions to the broker-dealer through which such Research Service was obtained. The advisory fee paid is not reduced because the investment adviser receives such Research Services. [Emphasis added.]

27. The Eaton Vance Funds are named as nominal defendants herein to the extent that they may be deemed necessary and indispensable parties pursuant to Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and to the extent necessary to ensure the availability of adequate remedies.

Defendants

The Parent Companies

28. Defendant Eaton Vance is the ultimate parent company of the investment adviser defendants Eaton Vance Management and Boston Management and Research, defendants Eaton Vance, Inc. and Eaton Vance Distributors, Inc. as well as the Eaton Vance Funds, all discussed below in more detail. Eaton Vance also owns a significant interest in defendant Lloyd George Management (B.V.I.) Limited. At all relevant times, Eaton Vance was involved in creating, marketing and managing investment funds and providing investment management services to institutions and individuals. As of October 31, 2003, Eaton Vance managed $75 billion in assets. Eaton Vance conducts its investment management business through its two wholly-owned subsidiaries, Eaton Vance Management and Boston Management and Research. In its annual report on Form 10-K filed with the SEC on January 21, 2004, Eaton Vance reported 2003 annual
investment advisory and administration fee revenue of $296 million. The largest category of
investment advisory fees consisted of fees from mutual funds, which fees are based on the daily
average net assets of the funds. Eaton Vance reported annual fund fees of $237 million in 2003,
incorporated in Maryland and its principal executive offices are located at The Eaton Vance
Building, 255 State Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02109.

29. Defendant Eaton Vance, Inc. ("EV") served as trustee of the Eaton Vance Funds and the investment advisers Eaton Vance Management and Boston Management and Research, described below, and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Eaton Vance. EV is a Massachusetts corporation located at 255 State Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02109.

30. Defendant Lloyd George Management (B.V.I.) Limited ("LGML") is the parent company of defendant Lloyd George Management, defined below. During the Class Period, Eaton Vance owned a significant interest in LGML. LGML is located at Suite 3808, One Exchange Square, Central, Hong Kong.

The Investment Advisers

31. Defendant Eaton Vance Management ("EVM"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Eaton Vance, is registered as an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act and managed and advised the Eaton Vance Funds, with the exceptions of the Eaton Vance Funds managed by co-defendants OrbiMed and Lloyd George Management, identified below. However, pursuant to agreements with OrbiMed and Lloyd George Management, defendant EVM, as investment adviser to the Funds, provided overall investment management services to each of the Master Funds, subject to the supervision of each fund's board of trustees. Defendant EVM also served as administrator or manager to the funds (including those managed by Lloyd
George Management and OrbiMed) and was responsible for managing the business affairs of these funds, subject to the oversight of each fund’s board of trustees. EVM’s services included recordkeeping, preparing and filing documents required to comply with federal and state securities laws and supervising the activities of the funds’ custodian and transfer agent. EVM received fees calculated as a percentage of net assets under management and was a beneficiary of the secret plan to push Eaton Vance Funds. Defendant EVM is organized under Massachusetts law and is located at the Eaton Vance Building, 255 State Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02109.

32. Defendant Boston Management and Research (“BMR”), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Eaton Vance, is registered as an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act and managed and advised the Eaton Vance Funds, with the exception of the Eaton Vance Funds managed by co-defendants OrbiMed and Lloyd George Management, identified below. However, pursuant to agreements with OrbiMed and Lloyd George Management, defendant BMR, as investment adviser to the Funds, provided overall investment management services to each of the Master Funds, subject to the supervision of each fund’s board of trustees. BMR received fees calculated as a percentage of net assets under management and was a beneficiary of the secret plan to push Eaton Vance Funds. Defendant BMR is organized under Massachusetts law and is located at the Eaton Vance Building, 255 State Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02109.

34. Defendant Lloyd George Investment Management (Bermuda) Limited ("Lloyd George Management" or "LGM") is an investment management company affiliated with Eaton Vance that made investment decisions for certain of the Eaton Vance Funds, including the Eaton Vance Asian Small Companies Fund; the Eaton Vance Emerging Markets Fund; the Eaton Vance Greater China Growth Fund; and the Eaton Vance Greater India Fund. Defendant LGM is registered as an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act and is located at Suite 3808, One Exchange Square, Central, Hong Kong.

35. Defendants EVM, BMR, OrbiMed and LGM are referred to collectively herein as the "Investment Adviser Defendants." Fees payable to the Investment Adviser Defendants are calculated as a percentage of assets under management. The Investment Adviser Defendants had ultimate responsibility for overseeing the day-to-day management of the Eaton Vance Funds.

36. Pursuant to their advisory agreements with the Eaton Vance Portfolios, the Investment Adviser Defendants provide to the Portfolios research, advice, and supervision with respect to investment matters. Additionally, the Advisers: (i) determine through which broker-dealers the Portfolios will execute their securities transactions; and (ii) negotiate with broker-dealers the terms of such agreements, including commissions, the amounts of Soft Dollars (as defined below), revenue-sharing and directed-brokerage payments (discussed more fully hereinafter) to be paid by the Funds’ investors to the broker-dealers.

The Directors, Officers and Trustees of the Eaton Vance Funds

37. During the Class Period, defendant Jessica M. Bibliowicz ("Bibliowicz") was a Trustee charged with overseeing 193 Portfolios in the Fund complex which includes both Master and Feeder funds in the Master-Feeder structure. Bibliowicz also serves as President and CEO of National Financial Partners, an independent distributor of financial services. Bibliowicz
violated her fiduciary duties to the Funds and the Funds investors by knowingly and/or recklessly participating in, approving, and/or allowing the conduct complained of herein. For her service as a Director or Trustee, in 2003 Bibliowicz received compensation of $160,000.

38. During the Class Period, defendant James B. Hawkes ("Hawkes") was a Trustee charged with overseeing 195 Portfolios in the Fund complex which includes both Master and Feeder funds in the Master-Feeder structure. In the past five years, Hawkes also served as Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of Eaton Vance, EVM, BMR and EV. Hawkes also served as Director of EV and Vice President and Director of EVD. Hawkes violated his fiduciary duties to the Funds and the Funds investors by knowingly and/or recklessly participating in, approving, and/or allowing the conduct complained of herein. In 2003, in his capacity as CEO of Eaton Vance, Hawkes received compensation in excess of $3.1 million.

39. During the Class Period, defendant Samuel L. Hayes, III ("Hayes"), was a Trustee charged with overseeing 195 Portfolios in the Fund complex which includes both Master and Feeder funds in the Master-Feeder structure. Hayes violated his fiduciary duties to the Funds and the Funds investors by knowingly and/or recklessly participating in, approving, and/or allowing the conduct complained of herein. For his service as a Trustee, in 2003 Hayes received compensation of $180,000.

40. During the Class Period, defendant William H. Park ("Park") was a Trustee charged with overseeing 192 Portfolios in the Fund complex which includes both Master and Feeder funds in the Master-Feeder structure. Park violated his fiduciary duties to the Funds and the Funds investors by knowingly and/or recklessly participating in, approving, and/or allowing the conduct complained of herein. For his service as a Trustee, in 2002 Park received compensation of $160,000.
41. During the Class Period, defendant Ronald A. Pearlman ("Pearlman") was a Trustee charged with overseeing 192 Portfolios in the Fund complex which includes both Master and Feeder funds in the Master-Feeder structure. Pearlman violated his fiduciary duties to the Funds and the Funds investors by knowingly and/or recklessly participating in, approving, and/or allowing the conduct complained of herein. For his service as a Trustee, in 2002 Pearlman received compensation of $160,000.

42. During the Class Period, defendant Norton H. Reamer ("Reamer") was a Trustee charged with overseeing 195 Portfolios in the Fund complex which includes both Master and Feeder funds in the Master-Feeder structure. Reamer violated his fiduciary duties to the Funds and the Funds investors by knowingly and/or recklessly participating in, approving, and/or allowing the conduct complained of herein. For his service as a Trustee, in 2003 Reamer received compensation of $170,000.

43. During the Class Period, defendant Lynn A. Stout ("Stout") was a Trustee charged with overseeing 195 Portfolios in the Fund complex which includes both Master and Feeder funds in the Master-Feeder structure. Stout violated her fiduciary duties to the Funds and the Funds investors by knowingly and/or recklessly participating in, approving, and/or allowing the conduct complained of herein. For her service as a Trustee, in 2003 Stout received compensation of $160,000.

44. During the Class Period, defendant Donald R. Dwight ("Dwight") was a Trustee charged with overseeing 190 Portfolios in the Eaton Vance Fund complex which includes both Master and Feeder funds in the Master-Feeder structure. Dwight violated his fiduciary duties to the Funds and the Funds investors by knowingly and/or recklessly allowing the conduct
complained of herein. For his service as a Trustee, in 2002 Dwight received compensation of $162,500.

45. During the Class Period, defendant Jack L. Treynor ("Treynor") was a Trustee charged with overseeing 171 Portfolios in the Eaton Vance Fund complex which includes both Master and Feeder funds in the Master-Feeder structure. Treynor violated his fiduciary duties to the Funds and the Funds investors by knowingly and/or recklessly allowing the conduct complained of herein. For his service as a Director or Trustee, in 2002 Treynor received compensation of $170,000.

46. During the Class Period, defendant Thomas E. Faust, Jr. ("Faust") was the President or Vice-President of Eaton Vance Mutual Funds Trust, Eaton Vance Special Investment Trust, Eaton Vance Investment Trust and Eaton Vance Growth Trust, and thus responsible for overseeing dozens of Portfolios in the Eaton Vance Fund complex which includes both Master and Feeder funds in the Master-Feeder structure. Faust violated his fiduciary duties to the Funds and the Funds investors by knowingly and/or recklessly allowing the conduct complained of herein.

47. During the Class Period, defendant Thomas J. Fetter ("Fetter") was the President of Eaton Vance Municipals Trust and Eaton Vance Municipals Trust II, and the Vice-President of Eaton Vance Mutual Funds Trust, and thus responsible for overseeing dozens of Portfolios in the Eaton Vance Fund complex which includes both Master and Feeder funds in the Master-Feeder structure. During the Class Period, Fetter was also the Portfolio Manger of the Eaton Vance South Carolina Municipals Fund, the Eaton Vance Ohio Municipals Fund and the Eaton Vance New York Municipals Fund. Fetter violated his fiduciary duties to the Funds and the Funds investors by knowingly and/or recklessly allowing the conduct complained of herein.
48. During the Class Period, defendant Michael R. Mach ("Mach") was Vice-President of the Eaton Vance Mutual Funds Trust and the Eaton Vance Large-Cap Value Portfolio. During the Class Period, Mach also acted as the Portfolio Manager of the Eaton Vance Tax-Managed Dividend Income Fund, the Eaton Vance Tax-Managed Value Portfolio and the Eaton Vance Large-Cap Value Portfolio. During the Class Period, Mach acted as Vice-President of EVM and BMR and was an officer of 24 registered investment companies managed by EVM or BMR. Mach violated his fiduciary duties to the Funds and the Funds investors by knowingly and/or recklessly allowing the conduct complained of herein.

49. During the Class Period, defendant Judith A. Saryan ("Saryan") was Vice-President of the Eaton Vance Mutual Funds Trust and the Eaton Vance Utilities Portfolio. During the Class Period, Saryan also acted as Portfolio Manager of the Eaton Vance Tax-Managed Dividend Income Fund and the Eaton Vance Utilities Portfolio. During the Class Period, Saryan acted as Vice-President of EVM and BMR and was officer of 23 registered investment companies managed by EVM or BMR. Saryan violated her fiduciary duties to the Funds and the Funds investors by knowingly and/or recklessly allowing the conduct complained of herein.

50. During the Class Period, defendant Cynthia A. Clemson ("Clemson") was Vice-President of the Eaton Vance Arizona Municipals Portfolio, the Eaton Vance California Limited Maturity Municipals Fund, the Eaton Vance California Municipals Portfolio, the Eaton Vance Florida Insured Municipals Portfolio, the Eaton Vance Florida Limited Maturity Municipals Portfolio, the Eaton Vance Florida Municipals Fund, the Eaton Vance Georgia Municipals Portfolio, the Eaton Vance Mississippi Municipals Portfolio, the Eaton Vance Pennsylvania Limited Maturity Municipals Portfolio, the
Eaton Vance Pennsylvania Municipals Portfolio and the Eaton Vance Tennessee Municipals Portfolio. During the Class Period, Clemson also acted as the Portfolio Manager of all such Portfolios. During the Class Period, Clemson acted as Vice-President of EVM and BMR and was an officer of 20 registered investment companies managed by EVM or BMR. Clemson violated her fiduciary duties to the Funds and the Funds investors by knowingly and/or recklessly allowing the conduct complained of herein.

51. During the Class Period, defendant Robert B. MacIntosh ("MacIntosh") was Vice-President of the Eaton Vance Mutual Funds Trust, the Eaton Vance Municipals Trust, the Eaton Vance Investment Trust and the Eaton Vance Municipals Trust II. During the Class Period, MacIntosh was the Portfolio Manager of the Eaton Vance Hawaii Municipals Fund, the Eaton Vance Louisiana Municipals Fund, the Eaton Vance Massachusetts Municipals Fund, the Eaton Vance Minnesota Municipals Fund, the Eaton Vance New Jersey Municipals Fund, the Eaton Vance North Carolina Municipals Fund, the Eaton Vance Rhode Island Municipals Fund, the Eaton Vance Virginia Municipals Fund and the Eaton Vance West Virginia Municipals Fund. During the Class Period, MacIntosh acted as Vice-President of EVM and BMR and was an officer of 127 registered investment companies managed by EVM or BMR. MacIntosh violated his fiduciary duties to the Funds and the Funds investors by knowingly and/or recklessly allowing the conduct complained of herein.

52. During the Class Period, defendant Duncan W. Richardson ("Richardson") was Vice-President of the Eaton Vance Mutual Funds Trust and the Eaton Vance Variable Trust. During the Class Period, Richardson also acted as Portfolio Manager of the Eaton Vance Tax-Managed Growth Portfolio, Senior Vice-President and Chief Equity Investment Officer of EVM and BMR and officer of 41 registered investment companies managed by EVM or BMR.
Richardson violated his fiduciary duties to the Funds and the Funds investors by knowingly and/or recklessly allowing the conduct complained of herein.

53. During the Class Period, defendant William H. Ahern, Jr. ("Ahern") was Vice-President of the Eaton Vance Mutual Funds Trust. During the Class Period, Ahern also acted as Portfolio Manager of the Alabama Municipals Portfolio, the Eaton Vance Colorado Municipals Portfolio, the Eaton Vance Connecticut Municipals Portfolio, the Eaton Vance Kentucky Municipals Portfolio, the Eaton Vance Maryland Municipals Portfolio, the Eaton Vance Massachusetts Limited Maturity Municipals Portfolio, the Eaton Vance Michigan Municipals Portfolio, the Eaton Vance New Jersey Limited Maturity Municipals Portfolio, the Eaton Vance New York Limited Maturity Municipals Portfolio and the Eaton Vance Ohio Limited Maturity Municipals Portfolio. During the Class Period, Ahern also served as Vice-President of EVM and BMR and as an officer of 35 registered investment companies managed by EVM or BMR. Ahern violated his fiduciary duties to the Funds and the Funds investors by knowingly and/or recklessly allowing the conduct complained of herein.

54. During the Class Period, defendant Scott H. Page ("Page") was President of the Eaton Vance Institutional Senior Floating-Rate Fund and Eaton Vance Prime Rate Reserves. During the Class Period, Page also acted as Portfolio Manager of the Eaton Vance Institutional Floating-Rate Portfolio and Eaton Vance Prime Rate Reserves. During the Class Period, Page acted as Vice-President of EVM and BMR and was an officer of 11 registered investment companies managed by EVM or BMR. Page violated his fiduciary duties to the Funds and the Funds investors by knowingly and/or recklessly allowing the conduct complained of herein.

55. During the Class Period, defendant Michael W. Weilheimer ("Weilheimer") was Vice-President of the Eaton Vance Variable Trust. During the Class Period, Weilheimer also
acted as Vice-President of EVM, BMR and EVD, as defined below, and was an officer of eight registered investment companies managed by EVM or BMR. Weilheimer violated his fiduciary duties to the Funds and the Funds investors by knowingly and/or recklessly allowing the conduct complained of herein.

56. During the Class Period, defendant Payson F. Swaffield ("Swaffield") served as Vice President of the Eaton Vance Variable Trust, the Eaton Vance Institutional Senior Floating-Rate Fund and Eaton Vance Prime Rate Reserves. During the Class Period, Swaffield also served as Portfolio Manager of the Eaton Vance Institutional Senior Floating-Rate Fund and Eaton Vance Prime Rate Reserves; Vice-President of EVM and BMR; and as an officer of 12 registered investment companies managed by EVM or BMR. Swaffield violated his fiduciary duties to the Funds and the Funds investors by knowingly and/or recklessly allowing the conduct complained of herein.

57. During the Class Period, Defendant Edward E. Smiley, Jr. ("Smiley") served as Vice-President of the Eaton Vance Special Investment Trust and the Eaton Vance Mutual Funds Trust. During the Class Period, Smiley also served as Vice-President of the Eaton Vance Small Cap Growth Portfolio, the Eaton Vance Special Equities Portfolio and the Eaton Vance Strategic Income Portfolio. During the Class Period, Smiley also served as Portfolio Manager of the Eaton Vance Small Cap Growth Portfolio and the Eaton Vance Special Equities Portfolio. During the Class Period, Smiley acted as Vice-President of EVM and BMR and was an officer of 36 registered investment companies managed by EVM or BMR. Smiley violated his fiduciary duties to the Funds and the Funds investors by knowingly and/or recklessly allowing the conduct complained of herein.
58. Defendants Bibliowicz, Hawkes, Hayes, Park, Pearlman, Reamer, Stout, Dwight, Treynor, Faust, Fetter, Mach, Saryan, Clemson, MacIntosh, Richardson, Ahern, Page, Weilheimer, Swaffield and Smiley are referred to collectively herein as the “Trustee Defendants” or the “Eaton Vance Funds Trustees.”

The Distributor

59. During the Class Period, defendant Eaton Vance Distributors, Inc. (“EVD” or the “Distributor Defendant”), EVM’s wholly-owned broker dealer registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”), marketed and sold the Eaton Vance Funds as the Funds’ principal underwriter and promoted and provided information regarding the portfolio management services of the Eaton Vance investment adviser(s) to unaffiliated third-party broker/dealer firms. EVD also implemented the Rule 12b-1 distribution plans entered into between EVD and the Eaton Vance Funds. EVD is located at The Eaton Vance Building, 255 State Street, Boston, MA 02109.

The John Doe Defendants

60. The true names and capacities of defendants sued herein as John Does 1 through 100 are other active participants with the above-named participants whose identities have yet to be ascertained.
SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS

DEFENDANTS IMPROPERLY USED FUND ASSETS TO UNDULY INFLUENCE BROKERS TO PUSH EATON VANCE MUTUAL FUNDS ON UNWITTING INVESTORS

Defendants Used Improper Means to Acquire “Shelf-Space” at Brokerages

61. Unbeknownst to plaintiffs and other members of the Class, Eaton Vance used the assets of its mutual fund investors to participate in “shelf-space” programs at various brokerages, including, but not limited to, Morgan Stanley, Salomon Smith Barney and Wachovia Securities. Eaton Vance improperly paid these and other brokerages to aggressively push Eaton Vance mutual funds on unwitting investors. Eaton Vance’s practices have led to investigations by the SEC, NASD and various state regulators. To date, these investigations have resulted in fines and censure of Morgan Stanley for its acceptance of the improper inducements from Eaton Vance.

Participation in Improper Shelf Space Programs

62. Eaton Vance participated in “shelf space” programs at brokerages such as Morgan Stanley, Salomon Smith Barney and Wachovia Securities. According to one former Eaton Vance senior manager who worked at Eaton Vance during the Class Period, Eaton Vance had to pay to play to participate in these “shelf space” programs.

63. Pursuant to the “shelf space” program agreements, brokers steered unwitting clients into Eaton Vance Funds because they were paid more for Eaton Vance Funds than other mutual funds.

64. The “shelf space” program Eaton Vance participated in at Morgan Stanley was called the “Partners Program.” The Partners Program was nothing more than a series of veiled payments by Eaton Vance to Morgan Stanley to steer unwitting investors into Eaton Vance Funds. In a nutshell, under the “Partner’s Program”, Morgan Stanley brokers improperly pushed Eaton Vance Funds on unwitting clients because they received more cash to do so.
65. Through the Partners Program, Eaton Vance paid excessive commissions to Morgan Stanley brokers to induce them to sell Eaton Vance Funds. According to former Morgan Stanley brokers and internal Morgan Stanley documents, pursuant to the Partners Program, Morgan Stanley adopted a broker “Incentive Compensation” payout grid that provided up to 3% greater compensation for “asset-based products” versus “transaction-based products.” Eaton Vance Funds were classified as “asset-based products,” while non-Partner Program funds were classified as “transaction-based products” and resulted in a smaller payout to the brokers.

66. Because of the improper inducements paid by Eaton Vance, Morgan Stanley’s management made it clear through firm-wide memos that it wanted its brokers to take advantage of the payout grid by directing investors into Eaton Vance Funds. As stated by Bruce Alonso, the managing director of Morgan Stanley’s Investor Advisory Services Division, in a firm-wide message entitled “An Important Message from Bruce Alonso Regarding the 2003 Compensation Plan” circulated throughout Morgan Stanley in December of 2002: “the recently announced 2003 Compensation Plan provides you with the opportunity to increase your overall compensation by focusing on asset-based products,” i.e., Eaton Vance Funds.

67. Under the compensation grid discussed above, for instance, a broker whose annual production was over $1 million received 42% of the commissions on “asset-based products” and 40% of the commissions on “transaction-based products.” Accordingly, brokers generally received a higher payout from the sale of the Eaton Vance Funds than “non-Partner” mutual funds.

68. Additionally, in order to further push Eaton Vance Funds and reap the benefits of the extra inducements from Eaton Vance, Morgan Stanley management gave Eaton Vance Funds priority placement in the review of fund materials to be distributed to Morgan Stanley brokers;
gave Eaton Vance access to Morgan Stanley’s branch system at the branch managers’ discretion; gave Eaton Vance direct access to Morgan Stanley brokers; included Eaton Vance in Morgan Stanley broker events; and invited Eaton Vance to participate in programs broadcasted to brokers over Morgan Stanley’s internal systems.

**Improper “Revenue Sharing” Agreements**

69. According to a former Eaton Vance senior manager who worked at Eaton Vance during the Class Period, Eaton Vance entered into agreements to make payments to brokerage houses in order to induce brokers to direct investors into Eaton Vance Funds. Eaton Vance referred to such arrangements internally as “revenue sharing.”

70. During the Class Period, as part of its “revenue sharing” scheme, Eaton Vance paid an additional 10 to 25 basis points override on gross sales to brokerage houses as a *quid pro quo* for the brokerages steering unwitting investors into Eaton Vance Funds. These deals constituted improper payments made in addition to the individual commissions paid to the brokerage houses for actual trades.

**Improper “Meeting Support And Fees”**

71. Eaton Vance used what it euphemistically termed “meeting support” or “meeting fees” as a method of improper payment to brokerage houses for their directing unwitting investors into Eaton Vance Funds. According to a former Eaton Vance account manager who worked at Eaton Vance during the Class Period, meeting support and fees involved substantial amounts, with as much as $60,000 or more being paid at a time to brokerages. Moreover, according to the former Eaton Vance account manager, because of the size of the transactions involved, Eaton Vance’s home office would be required to grant permission for such payments, which it always did.
72. According to both a former Eaton Vance East Coast wholesaler and a former Eaton Vance marketing representative, Eaton Vance would also provide luxury outings to brokers such as golf trips and dinners that Eaton Vance again euphemistically referred to as “meeting support” in order to have brokers steer unwitting investors into Eaton Vance Funds.

**Defendants Cloaked Their Practices in Secrecy**

73. Aware that its practices were improper, Eaton Vance went out of its way to hide its “shelf space” programs agreements. According to a former Eaton Vance West Coast wholesaler who worked at Eaton Vance during the Class Period, Eaton Vance went out of its way to ensure that the improper agreements detailed above were not put in writing. Eaton Vance was worried about creating a paper trail that would expose its practices. Additionally, employees were constantly reminded that the *quid pro quo* arrangements with brokerage houses were to be communicated verbally and not in any written form.

**Defendants’ “Shelf-Space” Programs Created Undisclosed Conflicts of Interests**

74. Defendants’ participation in “shelf-space” programs through the means described above created undisclosed, insurmountable conflicts of interest. For example, Eaton Vance’s participation in the “shelf space” program at Morgan Stanley created a carnival atmosphere where brokers did everything they could to steer clients into Eaton Vance funds in order to line their own pockets with money and prizes provided by Eaton Vance, with absolutely no concern for the well-being of their clients.

**The Fine and Censure of Morgan Stanley for its Involvement with Eaton Vance**

75. Morgan Stanley is just one of the brokerage houses to which Eaton Vance made improper inducement payments in order to have Eaton Vance funds pushed on investors. For its role in accepting these payments from Eaton Vance, among other wrongdoing, Morgan Stanley
has been fined and censured by the SEC and NASD and has agreed to pay fines totalling $50 million.

76. With respect to the “shelf space” program involving Eaton Vance discussed above, Stephen M. Cutler, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, stated that unbeknownst to investors in the Eaton Vance Funds, “Morgan Stanley received monetary incentives [from Eaton Vance] -- in the form of ‘shelf space’ payments -- to sell particular mutual funds [i.e., Eaton Vance Funds] to its customers. When customers purchase mutual funds, they should understand the nature and extent of any conflicts of interest that may affect the transaction.”

77. In fining and censuring Morgan Stanley, the SEC stated that the shelf-space program that Eaton Vance participated in violated Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act. Section 17(a)(2) expressly prohibits:

[T]he use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly...to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.

78. The investigations by the SEC and NASD and the resulting settlement with the first target, Morgan Stanley, has received wide praise, including from members of Congress. As stated by Sen. Peter Fitzgerald (R-III.) who is leading a Congressional inquiry into the mutual funds industry:

The settlement goes to show that the mutual fund managers as well as broker dealers have too often viewed mutual fund shareholders as sheep to be sheared. Congress has to figure out the variety of ways people are being sheared so that we can stop it.

The Investigation Continues

79. On January 14, 2004, The Wall Street Journal published an article under the headline, “SEC Readies Cases On Mutual Funds’ Deals With Brokers.” Citing “a person familiar with the investigation,” the article noted that the SEC was “close to filing its first charges against mutual fund companies related to arrangements that direct trading commissions to brokerage firms that favor those fund companies’ products.” The article stated in pertinent part as follows:

The SEC has been probing the business arrangements between fund companies and brokerage firms since last spring. It held a news conference yesterday to announce it has found widespread evidence that brokerage firms steered investors to certain mutual funds because of payments they received from fund companies or their investment advisers as part of sales agreements.

Officials said the agency has opened investigations into eight brokerage firms and a dozen mutual funds that engaged in a longstanding practice known as “revenue sharing.” Agency officials said they expect that number to grow as its probe expands. They declined to name either the funds or the brokerage firms.

The SEC said payments varied between 0.05% and 0.04% of sales and up to 0.25% of assets that remained invested in the fund. [...] People familiar with the investigation say regulators are looking into examples of conflict of interest when fund companies use shareholder money to cover costs of sales agreements instead of paying the sales costs themselves out of the firm’s own pockets. The boards of funds, too, could be subject to scrutiny for allowing shareholders’ commission dollars to be used for these sales agreements. In other cases, the SEC is probing whether funds violated policies that would require costs associated with marketing a fund to be included in a fund’s so-called 12b-1 plan.

Id. (Emphasis added).
80. Eaton Vance has admitted that the SEC, NASD and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts have focused “intensive inquiries” on Eaton Vance regarding the conduct alleged in this Complaint.

THE EATON VANCE DEFENDANTS ENGAGED IN IMPROPER CONDUCT

The Trustee Defendants Breached Their Fiduciary Duties To Eaton Vance Funds Investors

81. Mutual fund Board of Trustees have a duty to protect investors and closely guard the fees paid to an Investment Adviser and guarantee that they are not excessive and that the Investment Adviser is acting in the best interest of the mutual fund investors. As explained by William Donaldson, the head of the SEC, in a January 7, 2004 speech to the Mutual Funds Directors Forum:

The board of directors of a mutual fund has significant responsibility to protect investors. By law, directors generally are responsible for the oversight of all of the operations of a mutual fund. In addition, under the Investment Company Act, directors are assigned key responsibilities, such as negotiating and evaluating the reasonableness of advisory and other fees, selecting the fund’s independent accountants, valuing certain securities held by the fund, and managing certain operational conflicts.

The role of fund directors is particularly critical in the mutual fund context because almost all funds are organized and operated by external money-management firms, thereby creating inherent conflicts of interest and potential for abuse. Money-management firms operating mutual funds want to maximize their profits through fees provided by the funds, but the fees, of course, paid to these firms, reduce the returns to fund investors.

Independent directors, in particular, should serve as “independent watchdogs” guarding investors’ interests — and helping to protect fund assets from uses that will be of primary benefit to management companies. These interests must be paramount, for it is the investors who own the funds and for whose sole benefit they must be operated.


82. Likewise, the Investment Company Institute (“ICI”), of which Eaton Vance is a member, recently described the duties of mutual fund boards as follows:
More than 77 million Americans have chosen mutual funds to gain convenient access to a professionally managed and diversified portfolio of investments.

Investors receive many other benefits by investing in mutual funds, including strong legal protections and full disclosure. In addition, shareholders gain an extra layer of protection because each mutual fund has a board of directors looking out for shareholders’ interests.

Unlike the directors of other corporations, mutual fund directors are responsible for protecting consumers, in this case, the funds’ investors. The unique “watchdog” role, which does not exist in any other type of company in America, provides investors with the confidence of knowing that the directors oversee the advisers who manage and service their investments.

In particular, under the Investment Company Act of 1940, the board of directors of a mutual fund is charged with looking after how the fund operates and overseeing matters where the interests of the fund and its shareholders differ from the interests of its investment adviser or management company. [Emphasis added.]

83. The January 1, 2003 Statement of Additional Information for the Eaton Vance Information Age Fund is identical in substance to all Prospectuses in that it states that “the Trustees of the Trust are responsible for the overall management and supervision of the affairs of the Trust.” Likewise, the Statement of Additional Information sets forth in greater detail the purported process by which the investment managers should be selected:

In considering the renewal of the investment advisory agreement(s) between the Portfolios and the investment adviser, the Special Committee [of the Board of Trustees] considered, among other things, the following:

. An independent report comparing fees (in the case of a renewal);

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1 The ICI describes itself as the national association of the U.S. investment company industry. Founded in 1940, its membership includes approximately 8,601 mutual funds, 604 closed-end funds, 110 exchange-traded funds, and six sponsors of unit investment trusts. Its mutual fund members have 86.6 million individual shareholders and manage approximately $7.2 trillion in investor assets. The quotation above is excerpted from a paper entitled Understanding the Role of Mutual Fund Directors, available on the ICI’s website at http://www.ici.org/issues/dir/bro_mf_directors.pdf.
. Information on the investment performance (in the case of a renewal), the relevant peer group(s) of funds and appropriate indices;

. Sales and redemption data in respect of the Fund (in the case of a renewal);

. The economic outlook and the general investment outlook in the relevant investment markets;

. Eaton Vance, Lloyd George and OrbiMed’s results and financial condition and the overall organization of the investment adviser;

. Arrangements regarding the distribution of Fund shares;

. The procedures used to determine the fair value of each Fund’s assets;

. The allocation of brokerage, including allocations to soft dollar brokerage and allocations to firms that sell Eaton Vance fund shares; [emphasis added]

. Eaton Vance’s management of the relationship with the custodian, sub-custodians and fund accountants;

. The resources devoted to Eaton Vance’s compliance efforts undertaken on behalf of the funds it manages and the record of compliance with the investment policies and restrictions and with policies on personal securities transactions;

. The quality, nature, cost and character of the administrative and other non-investment management services provided by Eaton Vance and its affiliates;

. Investment managing staffing;

. Operating expenses (including transfer agency expenses) paid to third parties; and

. Information provided to investors, including the Fund’s shareholders.

84. In truth and in fact, the Eaton Vance Funds boards of trustees, i.e., the Trustee Defendants, were captive to and controlled by Eaton Vance and the Investment Adviser Defendants, who induced the Trustee Defendants to breach their statutory and fiduciary duties to
manage and supervise the Eaton Vance Funds, approve all significant agreements and otherwise take reasonable steps to prevent the Investment Adviser Defendants from skimming Eaton Vance Funds assets. In many cases, key Eaton Vance Funds trustees and officers were employees or former employees of the Investment Adviser Defendants and were beholden for their positions, not to Eaton Vance Funds investors, but, rather, to the Investment Adviser Defendants they were supposed to oversee. The Trustee Defendants served for indefinite terms at the pleasure of the Investment Adviser Defendants and formed supposedly independent committees, charged with responsibility for billions of dollars of fund assets (much of which were comprised of investors’ college and retirement savings).

85. To ensure that the trustees were compliant, the Investment Adviser Defendants often recruited key fund trustees from the ranks of investment adviser companies and paid them excessive salaries for their service as trustees. For example, James B. Hawkes, the Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of BMR, EVM, Eaton Vance and EV, is also the trustee and/or officer of 195 registered investment companies in the Eaton Vance fund complex (both Master and Feeder funds in the Master-Feeder structure), including the Eaton Vance Growth Trust. Other trustees responsible for the management of the Eaton Vance Growth Trust oversaw between 192 and 195 portfolios in the Eaton Vance fund complex.

86. In exchange for creating and managing the Eaton Vance Funds, the Investment Adviser Defendants charged the Eaton Vance Funds a variety of fees, each of which was calculated as a percentage of assets under management. Hence, the more money invested in the funds, the greater the fees paid to Eaton Vance and its related entities. In theory, the fees charged to fund investors are negotiated at arm’s length between the fund board and the investment management company and must be approved by the independent members of the
board. However, as a result of the Trustee Defendants’ dependence on the investment management company, and its failure to properly manage the investment advisers, millions of dollars in assets of Eaton Vance Fund investors were transferred through fees payable from Eaton Vance Funds assets to the Investment Adviser Defendants that were of no benefit to fund investors.

87. These practices proved to be enormously profitable for Eaton Vance at the expense of plaintiffs and other members of the Class who had invested in the Eaton Vance Funds. In this regard, a Forbes article published on September 15, 2003, stated as follows:

The average net profit margin at publicly held mutual fund firms was 18.8% last year, blowing away the 14.9% margin for the financial industry overall . . . . [f]or the most part, customers do not enjoy the benefits of the economies of scale created by having larger funds. Indeed, once a fund reaches a certain critical mass, the directors know that there is no discernible benefit from having the fund become bigger by drawing in more investors; in fact, they know the opposite to be true - once a fund becomes too large it loses the ability to trade in and out of positions without hurting its investors.

The [mutual fund] business grew 71-fold (20 fold in real terms) in the two decades through 1999, yet costs as a percentage of assets somehow managed to go up 29% . . . . Fund vendors have a way of stacking their boards with rubber stamps. As famed investor Warren Buffett opines in Berkshire Hathaway’s 2002 annual report: ‘Tens of thousands of “independent” directors, over more than six decades, have failed miserably.’ A genuinely independent board would occasionally fire an incompetent or overcharging fund advisor. That happens just about never.” [Emphasis added.]

88. Plaintiff and other members of the class never knew, nor could they have known, from reading the fund prospectuses or otherwise, of the extent to which the Investment Adviser Defendants were using directed brokerage, commissions, soft dollars and so-called 12b-1 fees to improperly siphon assets to brokers pursuant to the shelf space agreements discussed above.
The Investment Adviser Defendants Used
Rule 12b-1 Marketing Fees For Improper Purposes

89. Rule 12b-1, promulgated by the SEC pursuant to the Investment Company Act, prohibits mutual funds from directly or indirectly distributing or marketing their own shares unless certain enumerated conditions set forth in Rule 12b-1 are met. The Rule 12b-1 conditions, among others, are that payments for marketing must be made pursuant to a written plan “describing all material aspects of the proposed financing of distribution;” all agreements with any person relating to implementation of the plan must be in writing; the plan must be approved by a vote of the majority of the board of directors; and the board of directors must review, at least quarterly, “a written report of the amounts so expended and the purposes for which such expenditures were made.” Additionally, the directors “have a duty to request and evaluate, and any person who is a party to any agreement with such company relating to such plan shall have a duty to furnish, such information as may reasonably be necessary to an informed determination of whether the plan should be implemented or continued.” The directors may continue the plan “only if the board of directors who vote to approve such implementation or continuation conclude, in the exercise of reasonable business judgment, and in light of their fiduciary duties under state law and section 36(a) and (b) [15 U.S.C. 80a-35(a) and (b)] of the Act that there is a reasonable likelihood that the plan will benefit the company and its shareholders.” [Emphasis added.]

90. The exceptions to the Section 12b-1 prohibition on mutual fund marketing were enacted in 1980 under the theory that the marketing of mutual funds, all things being equal, should be encouraged because increased investment in mutual funds would presumably result in economies of scale, the benefits of which would be shifted from fund managers to investors. During the Class Period, the Trustee Defendants authorized, and the Investment Adviser
Defendants collected, millions of dollars in purported Rule 12b-1 marketing and distribution fees.

91. However, the purported Rule 12b-1 fees charged to Eaton Vance Funds investors were highly improper because the conditions of Rule 12b-1 were not met. There was no "reasonable likelihood" that the plan would benefit the company and its shareholders. On the contrary, as the funds were marketed and the number of fund investors increased, the economies of scale thereby created, if any, were not passed on to Eaton Vance Funds investors. For example, despite the fact that net assets for the Eaton Vance World Wide Health Sciences Fund increased from $418 million to $985 million during the class period, the net asset value per share of the fund decreased by more than 24%, falling from $12.33 per share at the end of the fiscal year for 2000 to $9.36 per share at the end of the fiscal year for 2003. Yet, during the same period, expenses charged by defendants increased, with the ratio of expenses to net assets jumping from 1.79% in 2000 to 1.81% in 2003, which comes as little surprise given that the total management and other fees collected by Eaton Vance for all Funds ballooned during the Class Period by more than 37% jumping from $173 million at the beginning of the Class Period to more than $237 million by the end of the Class Period.

92. Moreover, Defendants failed to impose any 12b-1 breakpoints - i.e. reductions in 12b-1 fees - as the assets of the funds increased. The concept behind breakpoints is that as fund assets increase, certain fixed costs remain the same, thereby reducing the overall costs per shareholder. Despite this fact, Defendants failed to impose 12b-1 breakpoints for payments that should not have increased as the size of the Fund assets increased as it did for the World Wide Health Sciences Fund.
93. This increase in fees while the net asset value plummeted, and the failure to grant any breakpoints, were red flags that the Trustee Defendants knowingly or recklessly disregarded. If anything, the Eaton Vance Funds' marketing efforts were creating diminished marginal returns under circumstances where increased fund size correlated with reduced liquidity and fund performance. The Trustee Defendants ignored or failed to review written reports of the amounts expended pursuant to the Eaton Vance Funds Rule 12b-1 Plan, and the information pertaining to agreements entered into pursuant to the Rule 12b-1 Plan, on a quarterly basis as required and hence failed to terminate the plans and the payments made pursuant to the Rule 12b-1 Plan, even though such payments not only harmed existing Eaton Vance Funds shareholders, but also were improperly used to induce brokers to breach their duties of loyalty to their prospective Eaton Vance Funds investors.

94. As discussed throughout this Complaint and below, in violation of Rule 12b-1, defendants made additional undisclosed payments to brokers, in the form of excess commissions, that were not disclosed or authorized by the Eaton Vance Funds Rule 12b-1 plan.

The Improper Use of Excessive Commissions and Directed Brokerage Business

95. The Investment Adviser Defendants paid excessive commissions and directed brokerage business to broker-dealers who steered their clients into Eaton Vance Funds as part of quid pro quo “shelf-space” program arrangements between Eaton Vance and brokerages. Such payments and directed-brokerage payments were used to fund sales contests and other undisclosed financial incentives to further push Eaton Vance Funds. These incentives created an undisclosed conflict of interest and caused brokers to steer clients into Eaton Vance Funds regardless of the funds' investment quality relative to other investment alternatives and to thereby breach their duties of loyalty.
96. By paying the excessive commissions and directing brokerage business to participate in “shelf-space” programs, the Investment Adviser Defendants violated Section 12 of the Investment Company Act, because such payments were not made pursuant to a valid Rule 12b-1 plan. Additionally, in several actions to date against brokerages and mutual funds, the SEC, the NASD and various other regulators have made it clear that the use of excessive commissions and directed brokerage to participate in “shelf-space” programs - as Eaton Vance has done here - is highly improper.

97. The excessive commissions and directed brokerage business used by Eaton Vance did not fund any services that benefited the Eaton Vance Funds shareholders. This practice materially harmed plaintiffs and other members of the Class from whom the illegitimate and improper fees were taken.

Improper Use of “Soft Dollars”

98. Investment advisers routinely pay brokers commissions on the purchase and sale of fund securities, and such commissions may, under certain circumstances, properly be used to purchase certain other services from brokers as well. Specifically, the Section 28(e) “safe harbor” provision of the Exchange Act carves out an exception to the rule that requires investment management companies to obtain the best possible execution price for their trades. Section 28(e) provides that fund managers shall not be deemed to have breached their fiduciary duties “solely by reason of [their] having caused the account to pay a . . . broker . . . in excess of the amount of commission another . . . broker . . . would have charged for effecting the transaction, if such person determined in good faith that the amount of the commission is reasonable in relation to the value of the brokerage and research services provided.” 15 U.S.C. §28(e) (emphasis added). In other words, funds are allowed to include in “commissions” payment for not only purchase and sales execution, but also for specified services, which the
SEC has defined to include, "any service that provides lawful and appropriate assistance to the money manager in the performance of his investment decision-making responsibilities." The commission amounts charged by brokerages to investment advisers in excess of the purchase and sale charges are known within the industry as "Soft Dollars."

99. The Investment Adviser Defendants went far beyond what is permitted by the Section 28(e) safe harbor by routinely using "Soft Dollars" as excessive commissions to pay brokers to push unwitting clients into Eaton Vance Funds. The Investment Adviser Defendants used Soft Dollars to pay for these excessive commissions as well as overhead costs (for items such as overpriced computer hardware and software) thus charging Eaton Vance Funds investors for costs not covered by the Section 28(e) safe harbor and that, consistent with the investment advisers' fiduciary duties.

Demand on the Boards to Take Corrective Action Would Be Futile

100. Plaintiffs have not made any demand on the Boards of Trustees (the "Boards") to institute this action. Such demand would be a futile and useless act because the Boards are incapable of making an independent and disinterested decision for the following reasons:

101. As alleged in detail herein, each of the Trustee Defendants who sat on the Boards was appointed by, and serves at the pleasure of, the Investment Adviser Defendants. Each of the Trustee Defendants who sat on the Boards is controlled by and beholden to the Investment Adviser Defendants for his/her position and substantial compensation as a Trustee. Although as a technical matter, the shareholders have a right to vote out the Trustees, the Trustees know that this is extremely unlikely if the Investment Advisers support the Trustees, which they have done throughout the Class Period. Accordingly, each of the Trustee Defendants is incapable of evaluating a demand independently and disinterestedly.
102. Because of their lack of independence from the Investment Adviser Defendants, the Trustee Defendants wrongfully approved the advisor fees, 12b-1 fees, Soft Dollars and the materially misleading disclosures in the Eaton Vance Fund Prospectuses in each of the years they served as Directors.

103. As alleged in detail herein, each of the Trustee Defendants knowingly participated in, approved, and/or recklessly disregarded the wrongs complained of herein. The conduct of the Trustee Defendants was in breach of their fiduciary duties and could not have been an exercise of good faith business judgment.

104. The Trustee Defendants allowed a course of conduct that prejudiced the Eaton Vance Funds and investors as the Trustee Defendants allowed the excessive fees to be charged and shareholder investments to be used for improper purposes such as kickbacks to brokers. The payment of kickbacks to brokers which injured shareholders was conduct that should have been prevented by the Director Defendants, but was not.

105. The Trustee Defendants also were self-interested in the improper kickbacks paid to brokers who steered their clients’ assets into the Eaton Vance Funds in order to increase the assets in the Funds. Growth of a mutual fund is one of the keys to its survival, for if a mutual fund’s assets stagnate or decrease, there is a great likelihood that the fund will be disbanded or merged with another fund. If the mutual fund is disbanded or merged, the board members for that fund necessarily lose their position on the fund’s board as well as the compensation for sitting on that fund’s board.

106. Additionally, each of the Trustee Defendants received substantial payments and benefits by virtue of his/her membership on one or more Boards and his/her control of hundreds of Eaton Vance Funds, as follows:
a) Defendant Hawkes oversaw 195 Portfolios and received $3.1 million in 2003 alone for his services to the Eaton Vance Fund complexes. During his tenure as an Eaton Vance officer and/or trustee, Hawkes has received tens of millions of dollars in compensation and benefits;

b) Defendant Bibliowicz oversaw 193 Portfolios and received compensation of at least $160,000 in each of the last three years;

c) Defendant Hayes oversaw 195 Portfolios and received compensation of at least $170,000 in each of the last three years. During his tenure as a Trustee since 1986, he received millions of dollars in compensation and other benefits;

d) Defendant Reamer oversaw 195 Portfolios and received compensation of at least $160,000 in each of the last three years. During his tenure as a Trustee since 1985, he received millions of dollars in compensation and other benefits;

e) Defendant Stout oversaw 195 Portfolios and received compensation of at least $160,000 in each of the last three years;

f) Defendant Park oversaw 192 Portfolios and received compensation of $160,000 in 2003; and

g) Defendant Pearlman oversaw 192 Portfolios and received compensation of $160,000 in 2003.

107. Each of the Trustee Defendants has thus benefited from the wrongdoing herein alleged and has engaged in such conduct to preserve his or her positions of control and the benefits thereof.

108. Each of the Trustee Defendants continues to serve as a Trustee, and the Trustee Defendants comprise the Boards. As disclosed in the Prospectuses, Defendants Bibliowicz and Hawkes are admittedly non-independent due to their positions with Eaton Vance, the Investment Adviser Defendants and/or their affiliates. Defendants Hawkes, Reamer, and Hayes have served as Trustees of one or more Eaton Vance Funds since 1982, 1985, and 1986, respectively. Thus, in order to bring this action for breaching their fiduciary duties, the Trustee Defendants would be required to sue themselves and their fellow Trustees with whom they have had close business
and personal relationships for nearly 20 years. Accordingly, a majority of the Boards is incapable of evaluating a demand independently and disinterestedly.

**The Prospectuses Were Materially False And Misleading**

109. Defendants use a series of combined prospectuses ("Prospectuses"), whereby several Funds were covered by one Prospectus during the Class Period. For this reason, the Prospectuses state that "a Fund could be held liable for a misstatement or omission made about another Fund." Plaintiffs and other members of the Class were entitled to, and did, receive one or more of these Prospectuses, pursuant to which the Eaton Vance Funds shares were offered.

110. Prospectuses are required to disclose all material facts in order to provide investors with information that will assist them in making an informed decision about whether to invest in a mutual fund. The law requires that such disclosures be in straightforward and easy to understand language such that it is readily comprehensible to the average investor.

111. Each of the Eaton Vance Prospectuses issued during the Class Period failed to properly disclose to investors material information about the mutual funds and the fees and costs associated with them. As seen below, each of the Eaton Vance Prospectuses contained the same materially false and misleading statements and omissions regarding strategies for growth, revenue-sharing, directed brokerage, 12b-1 fees and Soft Dollars.

112. Each of the Eaton Vance Prospectuses issued during the Class Period contained substantially the same materially false and misleading statements in that they omitted key information regarding the funds’ strategy for growth of assets, revenue-sharing, directed brokerage, 12b-1 fees and Soft Dollars that were required to be disclosed in “easy to understand language” such that a reasonable investor could make an informed decision whether or not to invest in the Funds.
Material Omissions Regarding Strategies for Growth

113. The February 1, 2003 Prospectus for the Eaton Vance Large-Cap Growth Fund is identical in substance to all Prospectuses issued during the Class Period in that it omits to state that one of the principal methods for increasing assets of the Funds was through participation in "shelf-space programs." For example, the February 1, 2003 Eaton Vance Large-Cap Growth Fund Prospectus states:

The Fund’s investment objective is to seek long-term capital growth.

The Prospectus then describes the strategies in which the Fund seeks growth. However, this statement is materially false and misleading because it failed to disclose that one of the strategies of the Fund to increase assets was through shelf space programs whereby it paid brokers kickbacks to steer clients into the Funds, thereby growing Fund assets.

Material Omissions Regarding Revenue Sharing

114. The February 1, 2003 Prospectus for the Eaton Vance Large-Cap Growth Fund is identical in substance to all Prospectuses issued during the Class Period in that under the heading SALES CHARGES it stated as follows with respect to its description of the distribution plan and method it offered its shares to the public that Defendants euphemistically referred to as "revenue sharing":

The principal underwriter may, from time to time, at its own expense, provide additional incentives to investment dealers which employ registered representatives who sell Fund shares and/or shares of other funds distributed by the principal underwriter. In some instances, such additional incentives may be offered only to certain investment dealers whose representatives sell or are expected to sell significant amounts of shares. In addition, the principal underwriter may from time to time increase or decrease the sales commissions payable to investment dealers.
115. The Prospectus is materially false and misleading in that it failed to disclose, inter alia, the following material and damaging adverse facts which damaged plaintiffs and other members of the Class:

(a) that the Investment Adviser Defendants and/or Distributor Defendant used investor assets to pay broker-dealers to satisfy bilateral arrangements with brokerages known as “shelf space” programs whereby the broker steered clients into Eaton Vance Funds;

(b) that the Investment Advisor Defendants used brokerage commissions over and above those allowed by Rule 12b-1 to pay for the “shelf-space” programs;

(c) that the Investment Adviser Defendants directed brokerage payments to firms that favored Eaton Vance Funds to satisfy bilateral arrangements with brokerages pursuant to “shelf space” programs and that this directed brokerage was a form of marketing that was not disclosed in or authorized by the Eaton Vance Funds Rule 12b-1 Plan;

(d) that the Investment Adviser Defendants and/or the Distributor Defendant compensated themselves out of investor assets for any payment made pursuant to revenue sharing agreements;

(e) that such revenue sharing payment created undisclosed conflicts of interest;

(f) that the Eaton Vance Funds Rule 12b-1 Plans were not in compliance with Rule 12b-1, and that payments made pursuant to the plan were in violation of Section 12 of the Investment Company Act because, among other reasons, the plan was not properly evaluated by the Trustee Defendants and there was not a reasonable likelihood that the plan would benefit the company and its shareholders;
(g) that any economies of scale achieved by marketing of the Eaton Vance Funds to investors were not passed on to Eaton Vance Funds investors; but rather, as the Eaton Vance Funds grew, fees charged to Eaton Vance Funds investors continued to increase; and

(h) that the Trustee Defendants had abdicated their duties under the Investment Company Act and their common law fiduciary duties, failed to monitor and supervise the Investment Adviser Defendant and, as a consequence, the Investment Adviser Defendants were able to systematically skim millions of dollars from the Eaton Vance Fund investors.

Material Omissions Regarding Directed Brokerage Business

116. The February 1, 2003 Eaton Vance Large-Cap Growth Fund Prospectus is identical in substance to all Prospectuses issued during the Class Period in that under the heading PORTFOLIO SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS it states as follows:

Subject to the requirement that the investment adviser shall use its best efforts to seek and execute portfolio security transactions at advantageous prices and at reasonably competitive spreads or commission rates, the investment adviser is authorized to consider as a factor in the selection of any broker-dealer firm with whom portfolio orders may be placed the fact that such firm has sold or is selling Fund shares or shares of other investment companies sponsored by the investment adviser or its affiliates. This policy is not inconsistent with a rule of the NASD, which rule provides that no firm which is a member of the NASD shall favor or disfavor the distribution of shares of any particular investment companies on the basis of brokerage commissions received or expected by such firm from any source.

117. The above statement is materially false and misleading in that it failed to disclose that Defendants chose brokers to execute sales for the Funds’ portfolios - and thereby directed the commissions from the sales of the portfolios’ securities to these brokers - to satisfy negotiated arrangements with brokerages to give Eaton Vance “shelf space” visibility and to push their clients into Eaton Vance Funds in exchange for directed brokerage. Additionally, the
above statement is materially false and misleading for its failure to disclose, *inter alia*, the following:

(a) that the Investment Adviser Defendants and/or Distributor Defendant used investor assets to pay broker-dealers to satisfy bilateral arrangements with brokerages known as “shelf space” programs whereby the broker steered clients into Eaton Vance Funds;

(b) that the Investment Advisor Defendants and/or Distributor Defendant used brokerage commissions over and above those allowed by Rule 12b-1 to pay for the “shelf space” programs;

(c) that the Investment Adviser Defendants’ and/or Distributor Defendant’s use of brokerage commissions violated the rules of the NASD;

(d) that the Investment Adviser Defendants and/or Distributor Defendant directed brokerage payments to firms that favored Eaton Vance Funds to satisfy bilateral arrangements with brokerages pursuant to “shelf space” programs and that this directed brokerage was a form of marketing that was not disclosed in or authorized by the Eaton Vance Funds Rule 12b-1 Plan;

(e) that the Eaton Vance Funds Rule 12b-1 Plans were not in compliance with Rule 12b-1, and that payments made pursuant to the plan were in violation of Section 12 of the Investment Company Act because, among other reasons, the plan was not properly evaluated by the Trustee Defendants and there was not a reasonable likelihood that the plan would benefit the company and its shareholders;

(f) that the Investment Adviser Defendants and/or the Eaton Vance Distributor Defendant compensated themselves out of investor assets for any payments made pursuant to revenue sharing agreements;
that such revenue sharing payments created undisclosed conflicts of interest;

that any economies of scale achieved by marketing of the Eaton Vance Funds to investors were not passed on to Eaton Vance Funds investors; but rather, as the Eaton Vance Funds grew, fees charged to Eaton Vance Funds investors continued to increase; and

that the Trustee Defendants had abdicated their duties under the Investment Company Act and their common law fiduciary duties, failed to monitor and supervise the Investment Adviser Defendants and, as a consequence, the Investment Adviser Defendants were able to systematically skim millions of dollars from the Eaton Vance Fund investors.

Material Omissions Regarding Soft Dollars

118. The February 1, 2003 Prospectus for the Eaton Vance Large-Cap Growth Fund is identical in substance to all Prospectuses issued during the Class Period in that under the heading PORTFOLIO SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS it states as follows:

As authorized in Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a broker or dealer who executes a portfolio transaction may receive a commission which is in excess of the amount of commission another broker or dealer would have charged for effecting that transaction if the investment adviser determines in good faith that such compensation was reasonable in relation to the value of the brokerage and research services provided. This determination may be made either on the basis of that particular transaction or on the basis of overall responsibilities which the investment adviser and its affiliates have for accounts over which they exercise investment discretion. In making any such determination, the investment adviser will not attempt to place a specific dollar value on the brokerage and research services provided or to determine what portion of the commission should be related to such services. Brokerage and research services may include advice as to the value of securities, the advisability of securities or purchasers or sellers of securities; furnishing analyses and reports concerning issuers, industries, securities, economic factors and trends, portfolio strategy and the performance of accounts; effecting securities transactions and performing functions incidental thereto (such as clearance and settlement); and the “Research Services” referred to in the next paragraph.

*   *   *
These Research Services include such matters as general economic, political, business and market information, industry and company reviews, evaluations of securities and portfolio strategies and transactions, proxy voting data and analysis services, technical analysis of various aspects of the securities markets, recommendations as to the purchase and sale of securities and other portfolio transactions, financial, industry and trade publications, news and information services, pricing and quotation equipment and services, and research oriented computer hardware, software, data bases and services.

119. The Prospectuses failed to disclose, *inter alia*, the following material and damaging adverse facts regarding Soft Dollars which damaged plaintiffs and other members of the Class:

(a) that the Investment Adviser Defendants and/or the Distributor Defendant used investor assets to pay broker-dealers to satisfy bilateral arrangements with brokerages known as “shelf space” programs whereby the brokers steered clients into Eaton Vance Funds;

(b) that the Investment Advisor Defendants and/or the Distributor Defendant used brokerage commissions over and above those allowed by Rule 12b-1 to pay for the “shelf space” programs;

(c) that the use of brokerage commissions to satisfy bilateral arrangements with brokers known as “shelf space” programs violated of Section 28(e) of the Exchange Act;

(d) that the Investment Adviser Defendants and/or the Distributor Defendant directed brokerage payments to firms that favored Eaton Vance Funds to satisfy bilateral arrangements with brokerages pursuant to “shelf space” programs and that this directed brokerage was a form of marketing that was not disclosed in or authorized by the Eaton Vance Funds Rule 12b-1 Plan;

(e) that the Investment Adviser Defendants and/or the Distributor Defendant compensated themselves out of investor assets for any payments made pursuant to revenue sharing agreements;
(f) that such revenue sharing payments created undisclosed conflicts of interest;

(g) that the Eaton Vance Funds Rule 12b-1 Plans were not in compliance with Rule 12b-1, and that payments made pursuant to the plan were in violation of Section 12 of the Investment Company Act because, among other reasons, the plan was not properly evaluated by the Trustee Defendants and there was not a reasonable likelihood that the plan would benefit the company and its shareholders;

(h) that any economies of scale achieved by marketing of the Eaton Vance Funds to investors were not passed on to Eaton Vance Funds investors; but rather, as the Eaton Vance Funds grew, fees charged to Eaton Vance Funds investors continued to increase; and

(i) that the Trustee Defendants had abdicated their duties under the Investment Company Act and their common law fiduciary duties, failed to monitor and supervise the Investment Adviser Defendants and, as a consequence, the Investment Adviser Defendants were able to systematically skim millions of dollars from the assets of Eaton Vance Fund investors.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

120. Plaintiffs bring certain of these claims as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a Class, consisting of all persons or entities who held shares, units or like interests in any of the Eaton Vance Funds between January 30, 1999 and November 17, 2003, inclusive, and who were damaged thereby (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are defendants, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which defendants have or had a controlling interest.
121. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to plaintiffs at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, plaintiffs believe that there are many thousands of members in the proposed Class. Record owners and other members of the Class may be identified from records maintained by EVD, the Eaton Vance Funds and the Investment Adviser Defendants and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using the form of notice similar to that customarily used in securities class actions.

122. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as all members of the Class are similarly affected by defendants’ wrongful conduct in violation of federal law that is complained of herein.

123. Plaintiffs can bring claims regarding all the Funds listed in Exhibit A due to the juridical link between the Funds as well as the fact that the Funds are essentially alter-egos of one another acting as one unitary organization.

124. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and have retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation.

125. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are:

   (a) whether the Investment Company Act was violated by defendants’ acts as alleged herein;

   (b) whether the Investment Advisers Act was violated by defendants’ acts as alleged herein;
(c) whether the Investment Adviser Defendants breached their common law fiduciary duties and/or knowingly aided and abetted common law breaches of fiduciary duties;

(d) whether statements made by defendants to the investing public during the Class Period misrepresented or omitted to disclose material facts about the business, operations and financial statements of the Eaton Vance Funds; and

(e) to what extent the members of the Class have sustained damages and the proper measure of damages.

126. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it virtually impossible for members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action.
INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT CLAIMS

COUNT I

AGAINST THE INVESTMENT ADVISER DEFENDANTS AND TRUSTEE DEFENDANTS FOR VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 34(B) OF THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT ON BEHALF OF THE CLASS

127. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein.

128. This Count is asserted against the Investment Adviser Defendants in their role as investment advisers to the Eaton Vance Funds and against the Trustee Defendants for their role in the creation of the materially false and misleading Prospectuses.

129. The Investment Adviser Defendants and Trustee Defendants made untrue statements of material fact in registration statements and reports filed and disseminated pursuant to the Investment Company Act and omitted to state facts necessary to prevent the statements made therein, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, from being materially false and misleading. The Investment Adviser Defendants and Trustee Defendants failed to disclose the following:

   (a) that the Investment Adviser Defendants authorized the payment from investor assets of excessive commissions to broker dealers in exchange for preferential marketing services known as “shelf space” and that such payments were in breach of their fiduciary duties, in violation of Section 12(b) of the Investment Company Act, and unprotected by any “safe harbor”;

   (b) that the Investment Adviser Defendants and/or the Distributor Defendant compensated themselves out of investor assets for any payment made pursuant to revenue sharing agreements;
(c) that the Investment Adviser Defendants improperly directed brokerage payments to firms that favored Eaton Vance Funds, which constituted a form of marketing that was not disclosed in or authorized by the Eaton Vance Funds Rule 12b-1 Plan;

(d) that the Eaton Vance Funds Rule 12b-1 Plan was not in compliance with Rule 12b-1, and that payments made pursuant to the plan were in violation of Section 12(b) of the Investment Company Act because, among other reasons, the plan was not properly evaluated by the Trustee Defendants and there was not a reasonable likelihood that the plan would benefit the company and its shareholders;

(e) that by paying brokers to aggressively steer their clients to Eaton Vance Funds, the Investment Adviser Defendants were knowingly aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duties, and profiting from the brokers’ improper conduct;

(f) that any economies of scale achieved by marketing of the Eaton Vance Funds to new investors were not passed on to Eaton Vance Funds investors; on the contrary, as the Eaton Vance Funds grew, fees charged to Eaton Vance Funds investors continued to increase;

(g) that defendants improperly used Soft Dollars and excessive commissions, paid from Eaton Vance Funds assets, to pay for overhead expenses the cost of which should have been borne by Eaton Vance and not Eaton Vance Funds investors; and

(h) that the Trustee Defendants had abdicated their duties under the Investment Company Act and their common law fiduciary duties, that the Trustee Defendants failed to monitor and supervise the Investment Adviser Defendants and that, as a consequence, the Investment Adviser Defendants were able to systematically skim millions of dollars from the Eaton Vance Funds investors.
130. By reason of the conduct described above, the Investment Adviser Defendants and the Trustee Defendants violated Section 34(b) of the Investment Company Act.

131. As a direct, proximate and foreseeable result of the Investment Adviser Defendants' and Trustee Defendants' violation of Section 34(b) of the Investment Company Act, Eaton Vance Funds investors have incurred damages.

132. Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class have been specially injured by Defendants' violations of Section 34(b) of the Investment Company Act. Such injuries were suffered directly by the shareholders, rather than by the Eaton Vance Funds themselves.

133. The Investment Adviser Defendants and Trustee Defendants, individually and in concert, directly and indirectly, by the use, means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce and/or of the mails, engaged and participated in a continuous course of conduct to conceal such adverse material information.

**COUNT II**

AGAINST EVD, THE INVESTMENT ADVISER DEFENDANTS AND THE TRUSTEE DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO SECTION 36(A) OF THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT ON BEHALF OF THE CLASS

134. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained above and otherwise incorporate the allegations contained above.

135. This Count is brought by the Class against EVD, the Investment Adviser Defendants and the Trustee Defendants for breach of their fiduciary duties as defined by Section 36(a) of the Investment Company Act.

136. EVD, the Investment Adviser Defendants and the Trustee Defendants had a fiduciary duty to the Class.

137. EVD, the Investment Adviser Defendants and the Trustee Defendants violated Section 36(a) by improperly charging investors in the Eaton Vance Funds purported Rule 12b-1
marketing fees, and by drawing on the assets of Eaton Vance Fund investors to make undisclosed payments of Soft Dollars and excessive commissions, as defined herein, in violation of Rule 12b-1.

138. By reason of the conduct described above, EVD, the Investment Adviser Defendants and the Trustee Defendants violated Section 36(a) of the Investment Company Act.

139. As a direct, proximate and foreseeable result of EVD’s, the Investment Adviser Defendants’ and the Trustee Defendants’ breaches of fiduciary duties in their roles as principal underwriter, investment advisers, and trustees and officers, respectively, to Eaton Vance Funds investors, Eaton Vance Funds and the Class have incurred millions of dollars in damages.

140. Plaintiffs, in this count, seek to enjoin Defendants from engaging in such practices in the future as well as recover improper Rule 12b-1 fees, Soft Dollars, excessive commissions and the management fees charged the Eaton Vance Funds by EVD, the Investment Adviser Defendants and the Trustee Defendants.

COUNT III

AGAINST EVD, THE INVESTMENT ADVISER DEFENDANTS AND THE TRUSTEE DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO SECTION 36(B) OF THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT ON BEHALF OF THE CLASS

141. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained above and otherwise incorporate the allegations contained above.

142. This Count is brought by the Class against the Investment Adviser Defendants and the Trustee Defendants for breach of their fiduciary duties as defined by Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act.

143. EVD, the Investment Adviser Defendants and the Trustee Defendants had a fiduciary duty to the Eaton Vance Funds and the Class with respect to the receipt of
compensation for services and of payments of a material nature made by and to EVD, the Investment Adviser Defendants and the Trustee Defendants.

144. EVD, the Investment Adviser Defendants and the Trustee Defendants violated Section 36(b) by improperly charging investors in the Eaton Vance Funds purported Rule 12b-1 marketing fees, and by drawing on the assets of Eaton Vance Fund investors to make undisclosed payments of Soft Dollars and excessive commissions, as defined herein, in violation of Rule 12b-1.

145. By reason of the conduct described above, EVD, the Investment Adviser Defendants and the Trustee Defendants violated Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act.

146. The Trustee Defendants received improper payments, in that they received their compensation despite the fact they violated their fiduciary duties.

147. As a direct, proximate and foreseeable result of EVD’s, the Investment Adviser Defendants’ and the Trustee Defendants’ breaches of fiduciary duties in their roles as principal underwriter, investment advisers, and trustees and officers, respectively, to Eaton Vance Funds investors, Eaton Vance Funds and the Class have incurred millions of dollars in damages.

148. Plaintiffs, in this count, seek to recover improper Rule 12b-1 fees, Soft Dollars, excessive commissions and the management fees charged the Eaton Vance Funds by EVD, the Investment Adviser Defendants and the Trustee Defendants.

COUNT IV

AGAINST EATON VANCE, EV AND EVM (AS CONTROL PERSONS OF EVD), EATON VANCE AND EV (AS CONTROL PERSONS OF EVM AND BMR), AND LGML (AS A CONTROL PERSON OF LGM) FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 48(A) OF THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT BY THE CLASS

149. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein.
150. This Count is brought pursuant to Section 48(a) of the Investment Company Act against Eaton Vance, EV and EVM as control persons of EVD; and Eaton Vance and EV as control persons of EVM and BMR; LGML as a control person of LGM who caused EVD, EVM, BMR and LGML to commit the violations of the Investment Company Act alleged herein. It is appropriate to treat these defendants as a group for pleading purposes and to presume that the misconduct complained of herein are the collective actions of Eaton Vance, EV, EVM, BMR, and LGML.

151. EVD is liable under Sections 36(a) and 36(b) of the Investment Company Act as set forth herein.

152. EVM, BMR and LGML are liable under Section 34(b), 36(a) and 36(b) of the Investment Company Act as set forth herein.

153. Each of Eaton Vance, EV, EVM, and LGML were “control persons” of EVD, EVM, BMR and LGML and caused the violations complained of herein. By virtue of their positions of operational control and/or authority over EVD, EVM, BMR and LGML, Eaton Vance, EV, EVM, and LGML directly and indirectly, had the power and authority, and exercised the same, to cause EVD, EVM, BMR and LGML to engage in the wrongful conduct complained of herein.

154. Pursuant to Section 48(a) of the Investment Company Act, by reason of the foregoing, Eaton Vance, EV, EVM, and LGML are liable to plaintiffs to the same extent as are EVD, EVM, BMR and LGML for their primary violations of Sections 34(b), 36(a) and 36(b) of the Investment Company Act.

155. By virtue of the foregoing, The Eaton Vance Funds, plaintiffs and the other Class members are entitled to damages against Eaton Vance, EV, EVM, BMR, and LGML.
INVESTMENT ADVISER ACT CLAIMS

COUNT V

AGAINST THE INVESTMENT ADVISER DEFENDANTS UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT FOR VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 206 OF THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT DERIVATIVELY ON BEHALF OF THE EATON VANCE FUNDS

156. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein.


158. The Investment Adviser Defendants had advisory contracts with the Eaton Vance Portfolios and served as “investment advisers” to the Eaton Vance Portfolios and other members of the Class pursuant to the Investment Advisers Act. The Eaton Vance Funds, and their shareholders, were the intended beneficiaries of these advisory contracts and investment advisor services.

159. As fiduciaries pursuant to the Investment Advisers Act, the Investment Adviser Defendants were required to serve the Eaton Vance Portfolios and Eaton Vance Funds in a manner in accordance with the federal fiduciary standards set forth in Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. §80b-6, governing the conduct of investment advisers.

160. During the Class Period, the Investment Adviser Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to the Eaton Vance Portfolios and Eaton Vance Funds by engaging in a deceptive contrivance, scheme, practice and course of conduct pursuant to which they knowingly and/or recklessly engaged in acts, transactions, practices and courses of business which operated as a fraud upon the Eaton Vance Portfolios and Eaton Vance Funds. The Investment Adviser Defendants breached their fiduciary duties owed to the Eaton Vance Portfolios and Eaton Vance
Funds by engaging in the aforesaid transactions, practices and courses of business knowingly or recklessly so as to constitute a deceit and fraud upon the Eaton Vance Portfolios and Eaton Vance Funds. The Investment Adviser Defendants are liable as direct participants in the wrongs complained of herein. The Investment Adviser Defendants, because of their position of authority and control over the Eaton Vance Portfolios and Eaton Vance Funds were able to and did control the fees charged to and collected from the Eaton Vance Portfolios and Eaton Vance Funds and otherwise control the operations of the Eaton Vance Portfolios and Eaton Vance Funds.

161. The Investment Adviser Defendants had a duty to (1) disseminate accurate and truthful information with respect to the Eaton Vance Portfolios and Eaton Vance Funds; and (2) truthfully and uniformly act in accordance with their stated policies and fiduciary responsibilities to the Eaton Vance Portfolios and Eaton Vance Funds. The Investment Adviser Defendants participated in the wrongdoing complained of herein in order to prevent the Eaton Vance Portfolios and Eaton Vance Funds from knowing of the Investment Adviser Defendants’ breaches of fiduciary duties including: (1) the charging of the Eaton Vance Portfolios and Eaton Vance Funds and Eaton Vance Funds investors improper Rule 12b-1 marketing fees; (2) making improper undisclosed payments of Soft Dollars; (3) making unauthorized use of “directed brokerage” as a marketing tool; and (4) charging the Eaton Vance Portfolios and Eaton Vance Funds for excessive and improper commission payments to brokers.

162. As a result of the Investment Advisers’ multiple breaches of their fiduciary duties owed to the Eaton Vance Portfolios and Eaton Vance Funds, the Eaton Vance Portfolios and Eaton Vance Funds were damaged.
163. The Eaton Vance Portfolios and Eaton Vance Funds are entitled to rescind their investment advisory contracts with the Investment Adviser Defendants and recover all fees paid in connection with their enrollment pursuant to such agreements.

NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW §349 CLAIMS

COUNT VI

AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS FOR VIOLATION OF NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW §349

164. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein.

165. This Count is brought pursuant to Section 349(h) of the New York General Business Law against all defendants who misrepresented and omitted to inform Plaintiffs and the Class through uniform materials, and/or participated in the deceptive acts and practices alleged of herein, that fees paid by Cass members would be used for purposes other than that which they were actually used. It is appropriate to treat these defendants as a group for pleading purposes and to presume that the misconduct complained of herein is the collective actions of all defendants.

166. Plaintiffs and other members of the Class never knew, nor could they have known, from reading the Prospectuses or otherwise, of the extent to which the Investment Adviser Defendants were using so-called 12b-1 fees, directed brokerage, excessive commissions and revenue-sharing to improperly and illegally siphon assets from the Eaton Vance Fund investors.

167. These omissions and practices alleged herein were unfair and deceptive when made and were made with the intent to, and did, (a) deceive Plaintiffs and the members of the
Class, and (b) induce plaintiffs and members of the Class to hold the Funds and pay excessive and undisclosed fees, in violation of Section 349.

168. By virtue of the foregoing, plaintiffs and other Class members are entitled to damages against all Defendants.

BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS

COUNT VII

BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AGAINST THE INVESTMENT ADVISER DEFENDANTS ON BEHALF OF THE CLASS

169. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each of the preceding allegations as though fully set forth herein.

170. As advisers to the Eaton Vance Funds, the Investment Adviser Defendants were fiduciaries to the plaintiffs and other members of the Class and were required to act with the highest obligations of good faith, loyalty, fair dealing, due care and candor.

171. As set forth above, the Investment Adviser Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to plaintiffs and the Class.

172. Plaintiffs and the Class have been specially injured as a direct, proximate and foreseeable result of such breach on the part of the Investment Adviser Defendants and have suffered substantial damages.

173. Because the Investment Adviser Defendants acted with reckless and willful disregard for the rights of plaintiffs and other members of the Class, the Investment Adviser Defendants are liable for punitive damages in an amount to be determined by the jury.
COUNT VIII

BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AGAINST THE TRUSTEE DEFENDANTS ON BEHALF OF THE CLASS

174. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each of the preceding allegations as though fully set forth herein.

175. As Eaton Vance Funds trustees, the Trustee Defendants had a fiduciary duty to the Eaton Vance Funds and Eaton Vance Funds investors to supervise and monitor the Investment Adviser Defendants.

176. The Trustee Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by reason of the acts alleged herein, including their knowing or reckless failure to prevent the Investment Adviser Defendants from (1) charging improper Rule 12b-1 marketing fees; (2) making improper undisclosed payments of Soft Dollars; (3) making unauthorized use of “directed brokerage” as a marketing tool; and (4) charging for excessive and improper commission payments to brokers.

177. Plaintiffs and the Class have been specially injured as a direct, proximate and foreseeable result of such breach on the part of the Trustee Defendants and have suffered substantial damages.

178. Because the Investment Adviser Defendants acted with reckless and willful disregard for the rights of plaintiffs and other members of the Class, the Trustee Defendants are liable for punitive damages in an amount to be determined by the jury.
COUNT IX

AIDING AND ABETTING A BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS ON BEHALF OF THE CLASS

179. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each of the preceding allegations as though fully set forth herein.

180. At all relevant times herein, the brokerages that sold Eaton Vance Funds had fiduciary duties of loyalty to their clients, including plaintiffs and other members of the Class.

181. The Defendants knew or should have known that the brokerages had these fiduciary duties.

182. By accepting improper Rule 12b-1 fees, Soft Dollars and excessive commissions in exchange for aggressively pushing Eaton Vance Funds, and by failing to disclose the receipt of such fees, the brokerages breached their fiduciary duties to plaintiffs and the other members of the Class.

183. The defendants possessed actual or constructive knowledge that the brokerages were breaching their fiduciary duties, but nonetheless perpetrated the scheme alleged herein.

184. Defendants’ actions, as described in this complaint, were a substantial factor in causing the losses suffered by plaintiffs and the other members of the Class. By participating in the brokerages’ breaches of fiduciary duties, defendants are liable therefor.

185. As a direct, proximate and foreseeable result of defendants’ knowing participation in the brokerages’ breaches of fiduciary duties, plaintiffs and the Class have suffered damages.

186. Because defendants acted with reckless and willful disregard for the rights of plaintiffs and other members of the Class, defendants are liable for punitive damages in an amount to be determined by the jury.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIMS

COUNT X

AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT
ON BEHALF OF THE CLASS

187. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each of the preceding allegations as though fully set forth herein.

188. Defendants have benefited from their unlawful acts through the excessive and improper fees they charged and received from plaintiffs and the other members of the Class. It would be inequitable for defendants to be permitted to retain the benefit of these overpayments, which were conferred by plaintiffs and the other members of the Class and retained by defendants.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for relief and judgment, as follows:

A. Determining that this action is a proper class action and certifying plaintiffs as the Class representatives and plaintiffs’ counsel as Class Counsel as pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

B. Awarding compensatory damages in favor of plaintiffs and the other Class members against all defendants, jointly and severally, for all damages sustained as a result of defendants’ wrongdoing, in an amount to be proven at trial, including interest thereon;

C. Awarding punitive damages in favor of plaintiffs and the other Class members against all defendants, jointly and severally, for all damages sustained as a result of defendants’ wrongdoing, in an amount to be proven at trial, including interest thereon;
D. Awarding the Eaton Vance Funds/Portfolios rescission of their contracts with the Investment Adviser Defendants, including recovery of all fees which would otherwise apply, and recovery of all fees paid to the Investment Adviser Defendants;

E. Ordering an accounting of all Eaton Vance Fund related fees, commissions, and Soft Dollar payments;

F. Ordering restitution of all unlawfully or discriminatorily-obtained fees and charges;

G. Awarding such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper, including any extraordinary equitable and/or injunctive relief as permitted by law or equity to attach, impound or otherwise restrict the defendants’ assets to assure that plaintiffs and the Class have an effective remedy;

H. Awarding plaintiffs and the Class their reasonable costs and expenses incurred in this action, including counsel fees and expert fees; and

I. Such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury.

Dated: August 26, 2004

MILBERG WEISS BERSHAD & SCHULMAN LLP

By: [Signature]
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Additional Plaintiffs’ Counsel
EXHIBIT A
EXHIBIT A

THE EATON VANCE FUNDS

Eaton Vance Tax-Managed Growth Fund 1.2
Eaton Vance Tax-Managed Growth Fund 1.1
Eaton Vance Tax-Managed Growth Fund 1.0
Eaton Vance Tax-Managed Dividend Income Fund
Eaton Vance Tax-Managed Equity Asset Allocation Fund
Eaton Vance Tax-Managed International Growth Fund
Eaton Vance Tax-Managed Mid-Cap Core Fund
Eaton Vance Tax-Managed Multi-Cap Opportunity Fund
Eaton Vance Tax-Managed Small-Cap Growth Fund 1.2
Eaton Vance Tax-Managed Small-Cap Growth Fund 1.1
Eaton Vance Tax-Managed Small-Cap Value Fund
Eaton Vance Tax-Managed Value Fund
Eaton Vance Balanced Fund
Eaton Vance Growth Fund
Eaton Vance Large-Cap Core Fund
Eaton Vance Atlanta Cap Large-Cap Growth Fund
Eaton Vance Large-Cap Value Fund
Eaton Vance Atlanta Cap Small-Cap Fund
Eaton Vance Small-Cap Growth Fund
Eaton Vance Small-Cap Value Fund
Eaton Vance Special Equities Fund
Eaton Vance Utilities Fund
Eaton Vance Asian Small Companies Fund
Eaton Vance Emerging Markets Fund
Eaton Vance Greater China Growth Fund
Eaton Vance Greater India Fund
Eaton Vance Global Growth Fund
Eaton Vance Worldwide Health Science Fund
Eaton Vance Advisers Senior Floating-Rate Fund
Eaton Vance Atlanta Capital Intermediate Bond Fund
Eaton Vance Classic Senior Floating-Rate Fund
Eaton Vance Floating-Rate Fund
Eaton Vance Floating-Rate High Income Fund
Eaton Vance Government Obligations Fund
Eaton Vance High Income Fund
Eaton Vance Income Fund of Boston
Eaton Vance Institutional Senior Floating-Rate Fund
Eaton Vance Low Duration Fund
Eaton Vance Prime Rate Reserves
Eaton Vance Strategic Income Fund
Eaton Vance High Yield Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance Municipal Bond Fund
Eaton Vance National Limited Maturity Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance National Municipals Fund

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Eaton Vance Alabama Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance Arizona Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance Arkansas Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance California Limited Maturity Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance California Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance Colorado Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance Connecticut Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance Florida Insured Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance Florida Limited Maturity Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance Florida Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance Georgia Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance Hawaii Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance Kansas Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance Kentucky Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance Louisiana Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance Maryland Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance Massachusetts Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance Massachusetts Limited Maturity Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance Michigan Municipals Fund
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Eaton Vance Ohio Limited Maturity Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance Ohio Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance Oregon Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance Pennsylvania Limited Maturity Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance Pennsylvania Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance Rhode Island Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance South Carolina Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance Tennessee Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance Virginia Municipals Fund
Eaton Vance West Virginia Municipals Fund
EXHIBIT B
VERIFICATION

I, Paul Bellikoff, hereby verify under penalty of perjury that I have reviewed the Complaint and authorized its filing and that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

DATED: 8/6/08

[Signature]

Paul Bellikoff
VERIFICATION

I, ___________ John B Perkins_________, hereby verify under penalty of perjury that I have reviewed the Complaint and authorized its filing and that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

DATED: 8/10/2004

[Signature]
VERIFICATION

I, Igor Lukashevich, hereby verify under penalty of perjury that I have reviewed the Complaint and authorized its filing and that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

DATED: 8-23-2004

By: [Signature]

Igor Lukashevich
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Michael R. Reese, do hereby certify that, on August 26, 2004, I caused a true and correct copy of SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT dated August 26, 2004, to be served on the persons identified in the attached service list via Federal Express.

Dated: August 26, 2004

Michael R. Reese
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service List</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MURRAY, FRANK &amp; SAILER LLP</td>
<td>WEISS &amp; YOURMAN</td>
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<td>Marvin L. Frank</td>
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<td>Firm Name</td>
<td>Associated Lawyers</td>
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<td><strong>KIRKPATRICK &amp; LOCKHART LLP</strong></td>
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<td>Stuart M. Glass (SG-6056)</td>
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<td>Sanford F. Remz, Tai H. Park</td>
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