![]() |
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Oppenheimer Holdings Inc. : Auction Rate Securities Summary: According to a press release dated April 11, 2008, the class action is brought against Oppenheimer Holdings Inc., Oppenheimer & Co. Inc, Oppenheimer Asset Management and Freedom Investments Inc. (collectively, "Oppenheimer"), in connection with the sale of auction rate securities, auction rate preferred stock, auction market preferred stock, variable rate preferred securities, money market preferred securities, periodic auction rate securities and auction rate bonds (collectively, "Auction Rate Securities"). The Complaint alleges that Oppenheimer violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by deceiving investors about the investment characteristics of Auction Rate Securities and the auction market in which these securities traded. The Complaint alleges that Oppenheimer offered and sold Auction Rate Securities to the public as highly liquid cash-management vehicles and as suitable alternatives to money market mutual funds. According to the Complaint, holders of Auction Rate Securities sold by Oppenheimer and other broker-dealers have been unable to liquidate their positions in these securities following the decision on February 13, 2008 of all major broker-dealers including Oppenheimer to "withdraw their support" for the periodic auctions at which the interest rates paid on Auction Rate Securities are set. The Complaint alleges that Oppenheimer failed to disclose the following material facts about the Auction Rate Securities it sold to investors: (1) the Auction Rate Securities were not cash alternatives, like money market funds, but were, instead, complex long-term financial instruments with 30 year maturity dates, or longer; (2) the Auction Rate Securities were only liquid at the time of sale because Oppenheimer and other broker-dealers were artificially supporting and manipulating the auction rate market to maintain the appearance of liquidity and stability; (3) Oppenheimer and other broker-dealers routinely intervened in auctions for their own benefit, to set rates and prevent all-hold auctions and failed auctions; and (4) Oppenheimer continued to market Auction Rate Securities as liquid investments after it had determined that it and other broker-dealers were likely to withdraw their support for the periodic auctions and that a "freeze" of the market for Auction Rate Securities would result. INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION: SIC Code: Sector: Financial Industry: Investment Services
WARNING AND DISCLAIMER OF LIABILITY: The information included on this Web site, whether provided by personnel employed by Stanford Law School or by third parties, is provided for research and teaching purposes only. Neither Stanford University, Stanford Law School, nor any of their employees, agents, contractors, or affiliates warrant the accuracy or completeness of the information or analyses displayed herein, and we caution all readers that inclusion of any information on this site does not constitute an endorsement of the truthfulness or accuracy of that information. In particular, this Web site contains complaints and other documents filed in federal and state courts, which make allegations that may or may not be accurate. No reader should, on the basis of information contained in or referenced by this Web site, assume that any of these allegations are truthful. Go to Search page | Go to Case Index page | Back to Top | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||