Our FirmAttorneysReport FraudContact Us  
Stanford University Law School - Securities Class Action Clearinghouse

[Web note: Page formatting approximates, but does not match exactly, that of filed paper document.]

STEVEN M. SCHATZ, State Bar # 118356
TERRY T. JOHNSON, State Bar # 121569
MARTA CERVANTES, State Bar # 139082
THOMAS J. MARTIN, State Bar # 150039
REBECCA A. MITCHELLS, State Bar # 151683
WILSON, SONSINI, GOODRICH & ROSATI
Professional Corporation
650 Page Mill Road
Palo Alto, California  94304-1050
Telephone:  (415) 493-9300

Attorneys for Defendants
WILLIAM J. SCHROEDER, GARY B. FILLER,
HYUNG HWE HUH and DIAMOND MULTIMEDIA SYSTEMS, INC.


                 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

                    COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA


JOANNE PASS, On Behalf of Herself   )   CONSOLIDATED CLASS
and All Others Similarly Situated,  )   ACTIONS
                                    )
          Plaintiff,                )   CV758927; CV759012 and
                                    )   CV759270
     v.                             )
                                    )   MEMORANDUM
                                    )   SUPPORTING
HYUNG HWE HUH, et al.,              )   DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
                                    )   STAY PROCEEDINGS
          Defendants.               )
                                    )   DATE:  November 12, 1996
                                    )   TIME:  9:00 a.m.
____________________________________)   DEPT:  17



                      I.  INTRODUCTION

     To evade recently enacted requirements of the federal 

securities laws, securities fraud plaintiffs have adopted a 

strategy of two-track litigation.  One case is filed in federal 

court, asserting federal securities law claims over which the 

federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction, along with pendent 

state claims.  At the same time, another case is filed in 

California state court, allowing plaintiffs to skirt the procedural 

and discovery restrictions of federal law.

     This situation has arisen because of the enactment of recent 

reforms to the federal securities laws.  The new provisions require 

stays of discovery while a motion to dismiss the complaint is 

pending.  This rule was designed to stop the abusive practice of 




filing vague securities fraud allegations, and using those claims  as a license for broad-ranging discovery in the hope of discovering  facts sufficient to survive federal pleading standards.  Because  California has no such automatic discovery stay while the pleadings  are tested, securities fraud plaintiffs have adopted the approach  of filing a state court action and using it to undertake the  discovery that is not allowed in federal court.  Thus, securities  fraud plaintiffs try to get the best of both worlds -- the  advantages of federal claims and the benefits of state court  discovery.      In this case, plaintiffs filed three virtually identical  actions in state court and launched a barrage of extensive  discovery before the three actions had even been consolidated.   Meanwhile, another plaintiff filed an action in federal court.   Discovery in that action is stayed consistent with the provisions  of the new federal law.  Plaintiffs here are using this action to  evade the stay of discovery mandated in the federal case,  subjecting defendants to the burden and expense that Congress  sought to stop.  But this legal maneuvering raises the specter of  inconsistent rulings, since the state and federal actions involve  the same defendants, nearly identical plaintiff classes and the  same alleged wrongful conduct.  This Court should exercise its  discretion to stay these consolidated actions pending resolution of  the federal case and thereby prevent these inconsistencies and  abusive practices.1                        II.  BACKGROUND      The plaintiffs in the consolidated state actions seek to  represent a nationwide class of stock purchasers who bought stock  in defendant Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. ("Diamond") from  October 26, 1995 through June 20, 1996.  State Complaint at ¶  11.2  Along with Diamond, the defendants are Diamond officers  Huh, Schroeder, and Filler, and Director Lee.  The asserted  wrongful conduct includes allegedly false statements relating to  Diamond's products, inventory and forecasts.  Plaintiffs allege  violations of the California securities laws, Cal. Corp. Code §§  25400, 25500, and fraud and deceit as codified by Civil Code §§  1709 and 1710. ____________________ 1    This motion is made in the alternative to defendants' Demurrer  and Motion to Strike, filed September 16, 1996, and defendants'  Motion to Stay Merits Discovery, filed September 20, 1996. 2    The three state complaints are virtually identical and are  collectively referred to as "State Complaint."                                 -2-
     As was noted in the Notice of Related Case previously filed by  defendants, the federal case, Frazier v. Diamond Multimedia  Systems, Inc. et al., was filed July 24, 1996 in the United States  District Court for the Northern District of California.3  It is  brought on behalf of a nationwide class of purchasers of Diamond  stock from November 1, 1995 through June 20, 1996.  Federal  Complaint at ¶ 13.  As in the state actions, the defendants are  Diamond and its officers Huh, Schroeder, and Filler and Director  Lee.  The asserted wrongful conduct in the federal case is the same  as in the state actions. Relief is sought in federal court for  alleged violations of the federal securities laws, and for fraud,  deceit and negligent misrepresentation under California law.                         III.  ARGUMENT A.   THE COURT MAY STAY THE CONSOLIDATED STATE ACTIONS      PENDING RESOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL ACTION IN THE      INTERESTS OF JUSTICE AND JUDICIAL ECONOMY      The Court may stay these consolidated actions in favor of  another forum "in the interest of substantial justice."  Cal. Civ.  Proc. Code § 410.30(a).  "Granting a stay in a case where the  issues in two actions are substantially identical is a matter  addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court."  Thomson v.  Continental Ins. Co. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 738, 746.  In particular,  "[i]t is black letter law that, when a federal action has been  filed covering the same subject matter as is involved in a  California action, the California court has the discretion but not  the obligation to stay the state court action."  Caiafa Prof. Law  Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 800, 804  (citing Thomson, 66 Cal.2d at 748; Farmland Irr. Co. v. Dopplmaier  (1957) 48 Cal.2d 208, 215). B.   A STAY OF THE CONSOLIDATED STATE ACTIONS SHOULD BE      GRANTED PENDING RESOLUTION OF THE SUBSTANTIALLY      IDENTICAL FEDERAL COURT PROCEEDING      In assessing the propriety of a stay, California courts  consider several factors: •    "the importance of discouraging multiple litigation designed       solely to harass an adverse party"; •    the importance "of avoiding unseemly conflicts with the courts       of other jurisdictions"; ____________________ 3    Class Action Complaint, Frazier v. Diamond Multimedia  Systems,  Inc. et al., No. C962644SBA (N.D.Cal. July 24,  1996) ("Federal  Complaint"), attached as Ex. A to the Declaration of Rebecca A.  Mitchells, filed herewith.                                 -3-
•    "whether the rights of the parties can best be determined by       the court of the other jurisdiction because of the nature of       the subject matter, the availability of witnesses or the stage       to which the proceedings in the other court have already       advanced"; and, •    whether "the federal action is pending in California . . . ." Caiafa Prof. Law Corp., 15 Cal.App.4th at 804 (quoting Farmland  Irr. Co., 48 Cal.2d at 215; Thomson, 66 Cal.2d at 747); see also  Simmons v. Superior Court (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 119, 125  (these  premises guide the court "to avoid a multiplicity of suits and  prevent vexatious litigation, conflicting judgments, confusion and  unseemly controversy between litigants and courts").  Consideration  of these factors dictates that judicial economy and the interests  of justice are better served by staying the state consolidated  actions pending resolution of the federal proceeding.  A stay will  promote the efficient resolution of the claims, since multiple  actions take a greater toll on the parties' and the courts'  resources, and might also result in conflicting rulings. 1.   A Stay Will Prevent Waste of Resources and Unfair Burden      on the Defendants Caused by Concurrent Litigation      Involving Substantially Identical Parties and Issues      Concurrent litigation of the state and federal actions  unfairly burdens the defendants and wastes judicial resources.   Accordingly, an action should be stayed where the parties and  issues are "substantially identical" to those in another action.   Farmland, 48 Cal.2d at 215.  "'It is the policy of the law to  reduce to the minimum the number of actions which may subsist  between the same parties.'"  Simmons, 96 Cal.App.2d at 130  (citation omitted).      The defendants are identical in both these consolidated cases  and the federal action.  Also, it is beyond question that the class  plaintiffs seek to represent (a nationwide class who purchased  Diamond stock from October 26, 1995 through June 20, 1996) is  "substantially identical" to the class the federal plaintiff seeks  to represent (a nationwide class who purchased Diamond stock from  November 1, 1995 through June 20, 1996).      Likewise, the factual allegations and the nature of the claims  in the consolidated state actions and federal action are  substantially identical.  Plaintiffs in both forums claim that the  defendants made false and misleading statements causing plaintiffs  to purchase Diamond stock at allegedly artificially inflated  prices.  Both the federal proceeding and these actions seek relief  for alleged fraud and deceit under California law.  The state  actions allege violations of state securities laws; the federal  action alleges violations of the federal securities law based on                                  -4-
exactly the same legal theory and the same alleged facts, i.e.,  that the defendants knowingly or recklessly made false and  misleading statements that deceived the investors as to the value  of Diamond stock.  Because these factual questions are the crux of  both cases, a resolution of the federal action "will be  determinative of all issues" included in the state court action.   See Simmons, 96 Cal.App.2d at 128.  As the California Supreme Court  warned:      [A] litigant may not, by eliminating or failing to plead       related claims arising out of the same circumstances, evade       the substantial identity rule. . . . the rules on staying an       action would be almost meaningless if the plaintiff could       automatically avoid a stay by juggling the pleadings and       amending a particular claim in the jurisdiction where he did       not wish to have the dispute tried. Thomson, 66 Cal.2d at 746, n. 5.  Moreover, federal securities law  cases are persuasive authority in the interpretation of  California's corporate securities laws.  See, e.g. People v.  Figueroa (1986) 41 Cal.3d 714, 727.  These considerations render  the factual and legal issues "substantially identical."      While the parties and issues are substantially identical, the  differences between the procedures for federal and state discovery  rest an unfair burden on defendants litigating in both forums.   First, Federal Civil Procedure Rule 26(d) imposes a mandatory stay  of discovery prior to an initial "meet and confer" conference among  the parties.  28 U.S.C.A. § 26(d) (1996).  California has no such  rule.      Second, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995  ("Reform Act") requires a mandatory stay of discovery in federal  securities class actions while a motion to dismiss is resolved.   Pub.L.No. 104-67; see also H.R. Rep. 104-369, 104th Cong., 1st  Sess. § 101(b) (Nov. 1995) (adding § 21D(b)(3)(B) to the federal  Securities Exchange Act, which requires that "[i]n any private  action arising under this title, all discovery and other  proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion to  dismiss . . . ").  Through this provision, Congress sought to  eliminate lawsuits that "force innocent parties to settle frivolous  securities class actions" through the threat of costly discovery.   Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, H.R.  Rep. 104-369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (Nov. 28, 1995).  Congress  also sought to remedy the type of abusive practices discussed  earlier, whereby "discovery in securities class actions often  resembles a 'fishing expedition' in which plaintiffs file suit in  the hopes of later discovery of facts that would support a viable  cause of action."  Id.; see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug  Stores (1975) 421 U.S. 723, 741 (observing that discovery in                                  -5-
securities class actions "permits a plaintiff with a largely  groundless claim to simply take up the time of a number of other  people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem  increment of the settlement value, rather than a reasonably founded  hope that the process will reveal relevant evidence . . . .").      California has no such rule.  Thus, although the Reform Act  has curbed these "fishing expeditions" in federal courts, they have  merely shifted to the state court forum. Defendants now face  multiple actions in different forums on behalf of the same  plaintiff class.  One set of named plaintiffs obtains the  advantages of federal substantive law, while the other set of  plaintiffs attempt to avoid the federal discovery stay by seeking  and obtaining discovery in the state action.  While the  Congressional preclusion of "fishing expeditions" has no California  counterpart, a stay of these proceedings would serve California's  interest in judicial economy by allowing the federal action to  ferret out the groundless claims before judicial and defendant  resources are wasted by burdensome and abusive discovery.  A stay  would promote judicial economy in all courts, reduce the risk of  unfairly burdening defendants, and would deter the routine filing  of parallel action in the future. 2.   A Stay Precludes the Risk of Unseemly Judicial      Conflicts Caused by Concurrent Litigation in Both      the State and Federal Courts      The virtually identical factual and legal issues involved in  both the state and federal actions set the stage for inconsistent  judicial findings and rulings.  A stay of these actions would avert  the risk of "unseemly conflicts" with the federal court.  See  Farmland, 48 Cal.2d at 215.  As in Caiafa Prof. Law Corp., where  arbitration proceedings were stayed pending resolution of a federal  action, the court warned that the       potential for "unseemly conflict" is great, unless both forums       should reach the exact same resolution of the issues.  On the       other hand, if the broader federal fraud action is allowed to       proceed to judgment first, it may well resolve the issues       Caiafa seeks to decide through a section 2860 arbitration in       the state court.  In that instance, the section 2860       arbitration would be entirely unnecessary.  "Unseemly       conflict" will have been avoided and the interest in judicial       economy well served. Caiafa Prof. Law Corp., 15 Cal.App.4th at 807.  Similarly, in  Schneider v. Vennard, class certification was denied in a  securities fraud state action.  Certification was denied, in part,                                  -6-
because interest in judicial economy favored adjudicating a  subsequently filed federal class action involving the same parties  and same facts:      It is undoubtedly preferrable from the point of view of the       judicial system to resolve the instant dispute by one class       action rather than by duplicate class actions in two       jurisdictions.  If two class actions were allowed to proceed       simultaneously, the already overtaxed resources of two courts       will have been devoted to the resolution of a single dispute.        Judicial economy and efficiency would not be served by       allowing both actions to proceed as class actions. Schneider v. Vennard (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1340, 1348.      In these actions, "unseemly conflict" would arise if, for  example, the courts in these proceedings differed on whether or not  the defendants' statements were misleading or their conduct was  fraudulent or deceitful under California law.  Moreover, to the  extent the classes of plaintiffs in the state and federal actions  will differ the plaintiff class in these consolidated actions is  only a subset of the federal class.  If this case can be pursued as  a class action at all, it can be pursued only on behalf of a class  of California stock purchasers, rather than a nationwide class of  stock purchasers as would be the case in federal court.4  Thus,  while the federal action will include the members of the plaintiff  class in this action, the opposite is not true.  Therefore,  inconsistent rulings might dispose of certain claims only as to a  subset of a nationwide class.      A stay of these consolidated actions would go far to fend off  such unseemly conflicts.  The federal court's judgment has the same  collateral estoppel effect in California courts as it would in  federal court.  Matter of Estate of Hilton (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d  1145, 1168.  Most, if not all, of the issues and claims in these  state actions will be resolved by the federal action.  Even if  issues or claims remain after resolution of the federal case, this  Court could then reach results clear of the specter of conflicting  with federal rulings. 3.   The Rights of the Parties Would Be Better Determined      in the Federal Action      A stay is called for because the rights of the parties are  better determined in the federal forum.  Accordingly, a federal  ____________________ 4    The California securities laws under which plaintiffs seek  relief require that each plaintiff purchased or sold stock "in this  state."  Cal. Corp. Code § 25400.  Under § 25008(a), a transaction  is "in this state" only where an offer to buy or sell is made or  accepted in California, or the security was delivered in California  and both the purchaser and the seller are domiciled in California.   As argued more fully in defendants' Motion to Dismiss at Section  I.A, plaintiffs have failed to allege that the members of a  nationwide class fulfill this requirement.                                 -7-
case that will resolve broader issues than those addressed in  another forum distinguishes the federal court as a "better forum  for deciding the full range of issues bearing on [the] subject  matter."  Caiafa Prof. Law Corp., 15 Cal.App.4th at 806  (arbitration of counsel fees issue stayed pending resolution of  broader fraud and RICO claims asserted in federal court).      In these proceedings, the federal court has exclusive  jurisdiction over claims brought pursuant to the Securities  Exchange Act of 1934.  15 U.S.C. § 78aa (exclusive federal  jurisdiction provision).  Federal judicial resolution of these  claims will bear on most, if not all, of the issues raised in these  proceedings.  Additionally, the federal court's pendent  jurisdiction over the common law fraud and deceit claims will  completely address the Civil Code §§ 1709 and 1710 claims raised in  these actions.      Moreover, the federal court affords broader relief than is  possible in state court.  While it is unlikely that plaintiffs will  be successful in their motion to certify anything more than a class  of California purchasers of Diamond stock, the federal action  asserts federal claims which may be brought on behalf of a  nationwide class.  Further, the state corporate law limit  plaintiffs' claims to alleged misstatements made "for the purpose  of inducing the purchase" of the defendants' securities.  Cal.  Corp. Code § 25400(d).  No such restrictions apply to federal Rule  10b-5 claims.  Indeed, the authors of the state corporate laws  specifically drafted § 25400 to "repudiate[] . . . cases . . . in  which the [federal] courts held that under Rule 10b-5 a corporation  might become liable for trading losses . . . simply because it  filed an allegedly false report with the [S.E.C.], although the  corporation was not engaging in any market activity at the time."   H. Marsh & R. Volk, Practice Under the California Corporate  Securites Law of 1968, § 14.05[4], at 14-52 - 14-53 (1969).  Thus,  the federal action will resolve the state common law fraud claims  as alleged in these proceedings, and will address the issues raised  by state corporate securities law issues as part of the broader  issues raised in the federal forum.      While the state cases were filed first, that is not  dispositive.  Rather, the courts look more broadly at all of the  factors discussed above, not just at the order of filing.  The  reasons discussed above for proceeding in federal court outweigh  the earlier filing of the state court cases, and demonstrate that  the state court cases should be stayed.                                 -8-
4.   Pendency of the Federal Action in California is a      Critical Factor Favoring a Stay of These Actions      That the federal action is in the Northern District of  California is a "critical factor favoring a stay of the state court  action."  Caiafa Prof. Law Corp., 15 Cal.App.4th at 804 (citing  Thomson, 66 Cal.2d at 747).  When both the federal and state  proceedings are in California, state courts are guided by a "strong  policy of comity" because a stay of the state action would not  cause "hardship on the plaintiff by forcing him to litigate in a  distant state."  Thomson, 66 Cal.2d at 747.  The Northern District  of California is here "of equal convenience to the parties and  witnesses as is the state court."  See Caiafa Prof state forum of abusive discovery "fishing  expeditions" recently precluded by federal securities laws.   A  stay would thereby prevent an unfair burden on defendants of  litigating in multiple forums under conflicting discovery  procedures and of being subject to the abusive discovery tactics  that the new federal rule was designed to prohibit.                                  Respectfully submitted, Dated:  September 20, 1996       WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI                                  Professional Corporation                                                   /s/                                  By _______________________________                                        Terry T. Johnson                                  Attorneys for Defendants                                  William J. Schroeder, Gary B.                                   Filler, Hyung Hwe Huh and Diamond                                   Multimedia Systems, Inc.                                 -9-


18 Feb 1997