Stanford University Law School - Securities Class Action Clearinghouse

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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                              )
LUCIAN B. COX, III            )    CIVIL ACTION NO. CV 97 6083
                              )    [filed Oct. 22, 1997]
          Plaintiff,          )
                              )    CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
     vs.                      )    FOR VIOLATION OF
                              )    FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
CITYSCAPE FINANCIAL CORP.,    ) 
ROBERT GROSSER, and           )    JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
ROBERT C. PATENT,             )
                              )
          Defendants.         )
                              )
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     Plaintiff, as and for his complaint, alleges the following

upon personal knowledge as to himself and his own acts, and upon

information and belief as to all other matters.  Plaintiff's

information and belief are based, inter alia, on the investigation

conducted by his attorneys, including a review of public filings of

defendant Cityscape Financial Corporation ("Cityscape" or the

"Company"), reports, press releases and articles pertaining to

Cityscape, and consultation with an accounting expert.


                      JURISDICTION AND VENUE


     1.   This court has jurisdiction of this litigation under

Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange

Act"), 15 U.S.C. Section 78aa.

     2.   The claims herein arise under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of

the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.  Sections 78j(b) and 78t(a), and Rule

10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the Securities and Exchange Com-

mission ("SEC") (17 C.F.R.  Section 240.10b-5).



3. Venue is properly laid in this district pursuant to Section 27 of the Exchange Act and 28 U.S.C. Section 1391(b). Many violations of law complained of herein occurred in this district, including the dissemination of statements alleged herein to be materially false and misleading. 4. In connection with the conduct complained of herein, defendants, directly or indirectly, used the means and instrumen- talities of interstate commerce, including the mails and interstate telephone communications and the facilities of a national securi- ties exchange. PARTIES 5. Plaintiff Lucian B. Cox, III purchased shares of Cityscape common stock on March 25, 1997 at $18.25 per share. 6. Cityscape has it [sic] principal offices in this district at 565 Taxter Road, Elmsford, New York 10523. Cityscape is a consumer finance company that, through its wholly owned subsidiaries, Cityscape Corp. and Cityscape Mortgage Corp. Ltd. ("CMC"), is engaged in the business of originating, purchasing, selling and servicing mortgage loans in the United States and the United Kingdom, secured primarily by one to four family residences. Cityscape was founded in 1985 and is headquartered in Elmsford, New York, with regional processing offices in California, Georgia, Illinois and Virginia. 7. Defendant Robert Grosser ("Grosser") served as Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and a director of Cityscape at all times relevant to this Complaint. 2
8. Defendant Robert C. Patent ("Patent") was at all relevant times Executive Vice President and a director of the Company. 9. The persons named as defendants above will sometimes be referred to herein as the Individual Defendants. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 10. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rules 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all persons (the "Class") who purchased or otherwise acquired Cityscape common stock from November 4, 1996 to August 13, 1997 (the "Class Period"). Excluded from the Class are the defen dants, the subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, and directors of Cityscape, the heirs and the members of the immediate families of the Individual Defendants, and the successors or assigns of any defendants. 11. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that there are at least hundreds of members of the Class. As of April 17, 1997, there were 29,744,322 shares of Cityscape stock outstanding, which stock traded in an open and efficient market on NASDAQ. 12. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class, and Plaintiff and all other members of the Class sustained injuries arising out of defendants' wrongful conduct complained of herein. 3
13. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the inter- ests of the members of the Class and has chosen counsel experienced in class action securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to, or in conflict with, the other members of the Class he seeks to represent. 14. The questions of law and fact common to the other members of the Class, and which predominate over any questions affecting individual members, are, inter alia: (a) Whether the federal securities laws were violated by defendants' acts as alleged herein; (b) Whether documents, releases and/or statements dis- seminated to the investing public and Cityscape shareholders during the Class Period omitted and/or misrepresented material facts about the business and financial condition of the Company; (c) Whether defendants made materially misleading statements during the Class Period about the business and financial condition of the Company; (d) Whether defendants acted knowingly and/or recklessly in making materially false statements and omitting material facts about the business and financial condition of the Company; (e) Whether the market price of the Company's common stock was artificially inflated during the Class Period due to the non-disclosures and/or material misrepresentations complained of herein; and (f) Whether the members of the Class have suffered damages and, if so, what is the proper measure of damages. 4
15. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by the Plaintiff or any other individual Class member may be relatively small, the expense and burden of indi- vidual litigation make it impossible for the Class members individually to redress the wrongs done to them. Plaintiff antici- pates no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. PARTICIPATION OF INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS 16. The Individual Defendants participated in the drafting and preparation of the various public documents (shareholder reports) and other communications complained of herein and were aware of, or recklessly disregarded the misstatements contained therein and omissions therefrom, and were aware of, or recklessly disregarded, their materially misleading nature. Because of their board membership and/or executive and managerial positions with Cityscape, the Individual Defendants had access to the adverse non- public information about Cityscape's business prospects and financial condition. The Individual Defendants, by reason of their stock ownership, management position, and/or membership on Cityscape's Board of Directors, were controlling persons of Cityscape and had the power and influence, and exercised the same, to cause Cityscape to engage in the illegal practices complained of herein. 5
CONTROL OF INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS 17. The Individual Defendants, because of their positions of control and authority as officers and/or directors of the Company, were able to and did control the contents of the various quarterly reports, SEC filings and press releases pertaining to the Company. The Individual Defendants were provided with copies of Cityscape's press releases and SEC filings after their issuance, with the opportunity to cause them to be corrected. Because of their board membership and/or executive and managerial positions with Cityscape, the Individual Defendants and Cityscape had access to the adverse non-public information about Cityscape's business and finances particularized herein via access to internal corporate officers and employees, attendance at Cityscape's management and Board of Directors meetings and committees thereof and via reports and other information provided to them in connection therewith. As a result, the Individual Defendants were responsible for the accuracy of the public reports and releases detailed herein as "group published" information, and are therefore responsible and liable for the representations contained therein under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. 18. The Individual Defendants either knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that the illegal acts and practices and mis- leading statements and omissions described herein would adversely affect the integrity of the market for Cityscape common stock and would artificially inflate or maintain the price of those securities. Each of the defendants, by acting as herein described, 6
did so knowingly or in such a reckless manner as to constitute a fraud and deceit upon Plaintiff and the other members of the Class who Plaintiff seeks to represent. BACKGROUND ALLEGATIONS 19. On April 22, 1996, Cityscape announced sharply higher mortgage originations and continued business expansion during its first quarter ended March 31, 1996. The Company announced that net income for that quarter rose to $9.3 million from just $1 million for the first period of 1995. The first quarter also saw domestic loan origination rise to $166.7 million from $60.8 million for the comparable period in 1995. Cityscape's United Kingdom operations showed loan originations of $27.4 million, a 37% increase over the $20 million recorded for the fourth quarter of 1995. These positive results were discussed by defendant Grosser in the press release: The strong performance this quarter reflects continued penetration of the US and UK markets. During the quarter, we originated a total of 2,962 loans from our network of over 800 mortgage brokers and loan correspondents on both sides of the Atlantic. We achieved this growth by expanding our product offerings, cultivating our broker and correspondent relationships and broadening our geographical presence. While achieving this growth, I am pleased to report that there were no loan charge-offs during the first quarter of 1996. This was a particularly eventful quarter for City Mortgage Corporation Limited, our UK subsidiary. We completed the first public European securitization of loans originated by City Mortgage, and we entered into a new funding agreement that should enhance the profitability of our UK business. We also 7
positioned City Mortgage for further growth by agreeing to acquire J&J Securities Limited. 20. On or about July 24, 1996, Cityscape reported its second quarter results. Net earnings for that period had increased to $34.8 million from $2.4 million. Domestic loan originations rose 74% as well. Cityscape's United Kingdom operations generated $41.4 million in loans for the second quarter, a 51% increase over the prior quarter's volume. The Company's UK subsidiary, City Mortgage Corporation, acquired total loan portfolios of $240.6 million during the second quarter as a result of its acquisitions of Heritable Finance Group and J&J Securities Ltd. 21. On August 20, 1996, the London-based newspaper the Daily Mirror reported on Cityscape's practices in the UK. The article noted the response of Britain's Office of Fair Trading when it was confronted with consumer complaints about the Company's practices: "The City Mortgage Corporation does hold a Consumer Credit Licence and we would look at any evidence to suggest that they were unfit to hold such a licence." 22. On or about September 5, 1996, The Wall Street Journal reported on Cityscape's stock-market rise. It noted that this had been aided by large increases in the Company's quarterly revenues and earnings, which were, in part, the result of several large acquisitions. The article noted that some analysts believed that Cityscape's business of specializing in making mortgage loans to homeowners with credit histories "has big growth potential due to such national economic trends as layoffs from corporate downsizings and rising consumer debt loads." It stated that a "recent report 8
by Montgomery Securities estimates that sub-prime lending volume will grow at 10% to 15% annually over the next five years, about twice as fast as the rate for prime-customer mortgage lending." The article quoted an analyst with NatWest Securities who favored Cityscape partly because of its recent expansion into the United Kingdom, where higher interest rates and more favorable lending rules than those in the US have resulted in higher per-loan profit, although he noted that the sub-prime market generally was "clearly becoming more competitive . . . ." 23. The September 5 article in The Wall Street Journal also reported that short sellers were betting that past ties between Cityscape consultant Jay Botchman and John Peter, a convicted felon, would bring the Company's shares down some. The article noted that Cityscape's shares had already been hit recently by rumors, which the Company had recently confirmed, that it was considering selling five million shares. Concerning this, defendant Grosser was quoted as stating that a stock offering was not "imminent necessarily" and that it would be part of normal financing activities. 24. A September 30, 1996 article in Barron's stated that in addition to considerable negative press in the United Kingdom over its lending practices, Cityscape was the subject of negative comments by a spokesman for the British Labor Party, "which is expected to win general elections next spring": These types of loans should be illegal. I would not hesitate to bring in retrospective legislation tearing up existing mortgage contracts. 9
In response, David Steene, of Cityscape's UK subsidiary CMC, stated that the Company was being treated unfairly by the British press and that Cityscape is operating in what was a woefully underserved market. He further noted that the Company's rates and terms were better than those that many other lenders offer subprime borrowers. 25. On October 21, 1996, an Investor's Business Daily report featured Cityscape and its expansion into the subprime home equity loan business in the United Kingdom. With respect to the UK business, the report said defendant Grosser had represented that Cityscape enjoyed margins that were approximately four times larger than those in the US. Grosser stated that "[i]n terms of raw securitizations, we are doing significantly more in the U.S. But from a revenue perspective, the UK loans are more profitable." The report noted that the chief reasons for the profit gap were the loan prepayment penalties in the UK, as well as longer payment schedules. Additionally, the report noted, "with so few players in the UK subprime market, companies there get higher rates on loans . . . ." Defendant Grosser was quoted as stating that "[w]e really feel we have a leadership role and pioneering role in exporting the nonconforming loan sector to the UK." The report confirmed that by the end of 1995, the Company had originated approximately $41 million in UK loans with another $68 million in the first half of 1996. Moreover, with the acquisitions of Heritable Finance Group and J&J Securities Ltd., the Company then held approximately $240 million in loans in the UK. The report concluded that the UK 10
business represents just under half of Cityscape's $153 million in annual revenues. SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS Defendants' False And Misleading Statements 26. In a November 4, 1996 press release (which was disseminated by Business Wire), Cityscape announced its financial results for its third quarter ended September 30, 1996. The Company reported net earnings of $14.9 million, a substantial increase from the $3.8 million reported for the same period in 1995. These results were repeated in the Company's Form 10-Q for its third quarter, filed with the SEC on or about November 19, 1996. In its November 4 press release, Cityscape attributed its 1996 results to "the continuing increases in both US and UK loan originations. The company's rising volume is primarily due to the ongoing expansion of its origination network, the introduction of new lending products and the overall growth of demand in its markets." Loan originations for the Company's UK operations were $67.6 million, up 393% over the comparable quarter in 1995 and up 63% over the second quarter of 1996 (excluding the second quarter loans acquired as a result of the J&J Securities Ltd. and Heritable Finance Group acquisitions). With respect to Cityscape's UK operations, defendant Grosser stated: In addition to the continued success of our domestic operation, our United Kingdom subsidiary, City Mortgage Corporation Limited ("CMC"), has made many significant advances during the quarter. . . . Earlier this year CMC obtained from Parliament a special license to provide financing for up to 4.5 million Council tenants who qualify to buy their 11
houses at a significant discount to market value under the "Right to Buy" legislation. Our Direct Marketing Division began operations in July initially targeting two million such households using direct mail and telemarketing, and CMC recently created an exclusive partnership with one of the UK's leading finance brokers to market CMC loan products through television advertising. . . . our growing production capabilities as well as the increasing acceptance of our products in the UK enabled us to complete two UK securitizations of $102 million and $189 million, respectively, subsequent to the close of the third quarter. 27. Defendant Grosser's statements described above were false and misleading because Cityscape knew, or recklessly disregarded the fact, that the Company's loan practices were under threat in the United Kingdom and, therefore, Cityscape knew that the high revenues generated by its UK loans would not continue in the future. Defendants knew that Cityscape's UK business represented just under half of the Company's total annual revenues. They also knew that one of the primary reasons the UK operations were so profitable was the loan prepayment penalties the Company exacted on borrowers in the UK. This practice was one of several that had caused considerable public outrage in Britain and had caught the attention of politicians there. For these reasons, defendants knew that reserves would likely have to be substantially adjusted upward to account for any limitations placed on its business practices by the government in the UK as any such limitations would reduce the Company's earnings substantially. 28. On November 11, a National Mortgage News Report noted that some analysts expected spreads on Cityscape's highly 12
profitable UK business to narrow. This expectation arose both from greater competition from other American companies entering the market, as well as "the possibility of the British Parliament's placing sharp (and possibly retroactive) restrictions on subprime home equity lending, the centerpiece of the City Mortgage Co. (Cityscape's London affiliate) business in the UK" (emphasis added). Defendants again attempted to downplay any possible effect to its UK operations. Tim Lembick, Cityscape's Chief Financial Officer, stated that "the company sees 'no real prospect of legislation' coming from the Parliament that would curb the company's activities.'" 29. On November 19, 1996, the Dow Jones News Service reported that Cityscape had revised its second and third quarter earnings results in order to reflect certain additional changes in the accounting treatment used in connection with the acquisitions of British-based Heritable Finance Group and J&J Securities Ltd. in the second quarter. Specifically, second quarter earnings were revised to $11.1 million from $8.3 million while third quarter earnings were revised to $14.4 million from $14.9 million. The report noted that the accounting changes involved resulted from the reclassification to goodwill of $5 million of restructuring charges expensed and $17.3 million in deferred tax assets recorded in the second quarter. The Company had noted that these changes resulted in an increase in the amount of goodwill recorded in connection with the acquisitions to $30.6 million from $10.6 million. 13
30. The Company's repeated false statements that its operations, including its UK operations, would continue to expand profitably influenced analysts covering the Company's stock. For example, on November 21, 1996, the Dow Jones News Service reported that a NatWest Securities analyst had restarted coverage of Cityscape with a "buy" rating. The analyst's research note said the Company's management team was "stronger and wiser in light of the company's difficulties." NatWest also noted that the Company's position in the United Kingdom was increasingly valuable. A few days later, in a November 25 Dow Jones News Report, it was reported that Wheat First Butcher Singer had upgraded its rating of Cityscape from "outperform" to "buy." The Dow Jones News Report stated that in a research note Wheat First Butcher Singer said it had "more confidence in Cityscape since accounting issues have been resolved, and that the company's shares have less downside volatility in the near term." 31. On or about March 31, 1997, Cityscape filed with the SEC its Form l0-K for the year ending December 31, 1996 (the "l996 Form 10-K"). The 1996 Form 10-K was signed by among others, defendants Grosser and Patent. Cityscape reported that in March of 1997, the Company had received notice from the British Office of Fair Trade (the "OFT") that in reviewing the Company's license the OFT would consider whether the Company had engaged in inappropriate loan practices. The Company implicitly admitted that it had engaged in at least some of the wrongful conduct. The Company stated: The majority of the stated business practices are either (i) not applicable to [CMC's] operations or (ii) 14
practices in which [CMC] engages and believes itself to be in compliance or easily able to modify its operations in order to comply with the OFT letter. The OFT letter, however, questions the appropriateness of standard concessionary rate structures1, as well as the calculation of prepayments using the Rule of 78 method.2 The Company is reviewing and evaluating its practices with respect to each issue raised in the letter. . . The Company does not believe regulatory initiatives set forth in the letter will have a material adverse effect on any of its mortgage loans or to the continuance of its licenses, although no assurances to that effect can be given at this time. (Emphasis added). The standard rate/concessionary rate structure utilized in some of its loans products is enforceable under English Law, and that providing for a Standard Rate that can be reduced to a Concessionary Rate upon prompt payment does not contravene the common law rule against charging penalty interest. In addition the Company believes that the provisions of such loans entitling the Company to accelerate repayment upon the occurrence of ____________________ 1 While the OFT, in the March 1997 letter to the Company, chose not to contest the legality of certain loan covenants, in actuali- ty, dual rate loans and the Rule of 78 method of calculating interest rebates were thinly disguised methods of charging sub- prime mortgagors penalty interest in direct contravention of English and Common Law. The standard/concessionary dual rate structure was CMC's attempt to circumvent the English and Common law rule against charging late payment penalty interest by assigning a dual rate structure to its loans whereby an extremely high "standard rate" of interest was assigned, but a borrower would be charged a lower, "concessionary rate" if payments were made when due. However, the "standard rate" is actually a penalty because (a) it is a substantially higher rate of interest than the "concessionary rate," and (b) it is only effective in accompanying late payments. 2 The "Rule of 78" is also an oppressive and deceitful attempt by Cityscape and CMC to charge mortgagors penalty interest. The Rule of 78 is a method by which CMC circumvented the English and Common law rule against charging pre-payment interest penalties. If a UK borrower redeemed his loan in full prior to the maturity date (whether voluntarily or through default) the equivalent of an early payment fee would be charged as a result of the borrower's contractual obligation to pay a stated amount of interest under his note. The majority of CMC's loans calculate the pre-payment fee by calculating the total principal and interest due over the full term of the loan then applying a rebate for the unexpired portion of the loan term. 15
specified events of default and calculate the interest rebate using the Rule of 78 with a six month deferment are not penalties. (Emphasis added). 32. The March 1997 letter further put defendants on notice by the OFT that such practices by Cityscape would no longer be tolerated. Defendants knew, or were reckless in not knowing, that because of, inter alia, press reports in the Fall of 1996 and the March 1997 OFT notification, the statements made in the 1996 Form 10-K were materially false and misleading, because in the 1996 10-K it was reported that "the Company does not believe regulatory initiatives set forth in the [OFT] letter will have a material adverse effect on any of its mortgage loans." The Company knew, or recklessly disregarded the fact that the high revenues generated by UK loans would not continue in the future, and that reserves would need to be substantially adjusted upward to account for this which would reduce earnings substantially. In essence, the Company knew and/or recklessly disregarded the fact that the OFT's regulatory initiatives would have a material adverse effect on the Company. 33. On April 24, 1997, as reported in Business Wire, Cityscape announced its first quarter results for 1997. Cityscape, attempting to maintain an illusion of continuing growth, and in an effort to maintain falling stock prices, reported record earnings for the first quarter of 1997. Cityscape reported an 80.6 percent increase in earnings on a 193.4 percent increase in revenues for its first quarter ended March 31, 1997, compared with the same period in 1996. Net earnings for the first quarter of 1997 were reported to be $16.8 million or 50 cents per fully diluted share, 16
up from $9.3 million or 31 cents per share in the first quarter of 1996. Revenues reportedly increased to $84.5 million for the quarter, from $28.8 during the same period in 1996. Domestic loan originations totaled $388.1 million up 132.8 percent over the $166.7 million originated in the first quarter of 1996. UK loan originations were reported to total $99.2 million, up 262 percent over the $27.4 million originated in the first quarter of 1996. However, gain on sales of all Cityscape loans increased $36.6 million or 151.9 percent to $60.7 million in the first quarter of 1997. This increase was due primarily to the Company's UK gain of $33.9 million on $117.4 million of loan sales in the first quarter of 1997, compared to a gain of $12.2 million on the $27.4 million of loan sales in the first quarter of 1996. While UK loan originations accounted for roughly 25 percent of Cityscape's overall loan volume, gain on sales of the UK loans was approximately two times the gain on sale of U.S. loans. 34. On April 24, 1997, Business Wire reported defendant Grosser's reaction to the first quarter results: The first quarter results underscore the Company's commitment to the fundamentals of our business, sound underwriting practices and aggressive servicing. Furthermore, defendant Grosser went on to exclaim that, "[Cityscape's] performance during the quarter reflects the continued growth of our new products and the strength of our core business, both in the U.S. and in the UK." 35. On May 12, 1997 Cityscape filed its Form l0-Q for the first quarter ending March 31, 1997 which repeated the results 17
disseminated on April 24. Cityscape again acknowledged receipt of the March 1997 letter from the OFT: The Company anticipates that the UK gain on sale margin will continue to decrease in the future as a result of the introduction of such new loan products and as a result of the Company's intention to discontinue originating unregulated loans that utilize the Rule of 78 method commencing in the early part of the second half of 1997. . . . The Company does not believe regulatory initiatives set forth in the letter will have a material adverse effect on any of its mortgage loans or to the continuance of its licenses, although no assurances to that effect can be given at this time. (Emphasis added). 36. The first quarter results announced by the Company on April 24, the statements made by defendant Grosser the same day, and the first quarter Form 10-Q were materially false and misleading because, inter alia, defendants, in violation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") (as set forth below) failed to record as a result of, inter alia, the OFT Notice, a valuation allowance relating to mortgage prepayments and Rule of 78 computations. The Company's failure to take the valuation allowance resulted in an overstatement in net earnings of $9.7 million after taxes and an overstatement in total revenues of $15 million. Furthermore, no steps were taken by the Company to correct the earlier statements made by defendant Grosser that growth would continue in 1997. Defendants failed to acknowledge the economic impact of discontinuing these loan practices, which related to a majority of loans made in the UK and which accounted for a substantial amount of Company profits. By reporting record earnings for the first quarter of 1997, Cityscape attempted to 18
create the impression that growth would continue. By reporting that regulatory initiatives would not have a material effect, Cityscape mislead investors into believing that operations, revenues and profits would not be materially adversely effected by changes in UK lending policy. 37. The first quarter results announced by the Company on April 24, 1997, the statements made by defendant Grosser the same day, and the first quarter Form 10-Q were materially false and misleading because defendants, in violation of the Company' [sic] own revenue recognition policy (as set forth below) failed to record as a result of, inter alia, the OFT Notice, a valuation allowance relating to prepayment and Rule of 78 reforms. The Company's failure to take the valuation allowance resulted in an overstatement in net earnings of $9.7 million after taxes and an overstatement in total revenues of $15 million. According to the 1996 10-K and the first quarter 1997 IO-Q, defendants were clearly in violation of Cityscape's revenue recognition policy. In the Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements, of Cityscape's first quarter l0-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 1997, at note 2, the Company stated: The accompanying consolidated financial statements and the information included under the heading 'Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations' should be read in conjunction with the consolidated financial statements and related notes of the Company for the year ended December 31, 1996. 38. In Cityscape's "Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements" contained in the 1996 10-K, Note 3, "Summary of 19
Significant Accounting Policies: Revenue Recognition," the Company stated, among other things: Gains and losses on sale of mortgage loans are realized when mortgage loans are sold to investors. . . . Gain on sale of loans is recorded on the settlement date. Included in gain on sale of loans is the present value of the differential between the interest rate payable by an obligor on a loan over the interest rate passed through to the purchaser acquiring an interest in such loan, less applicable recurring fees including the credit enhancements and trustee fees. . . . In the case of UK securitizations, or a sale into a loan purchase facility, the Company records a mortgage servicing receivable. . . . Although the Company believes it has made reasonable estimates of the fair value of the interest- only and residual certificates likely to be realized, the rate of payment and the amount of defaults utilized by the Company are estimates and actual experience may vary from its estimates. . . . Higher than anticipated rates of loan prepayments or losses would require the Company to write down the fair value of the interest-only and residual certificates, adversely impacting earnings. (Emphasis added). 39. Defendant Grosser had no basis in fact to make such optimistic statements about the future profitability of Cityscape since he knew and/or recklessly disregarded the fact that Cityscape should have recorded valuation allowances in the first quarter of 1997, due, inter alia, to the receipt of the March 1997 OFT letter. The valuation allowance in the amount of $15 million was ultimately recorded in the second quarter. 40. On May 25, 1997, the London-based newspaper The Times reported the following account of CMC's "aggressive servicing" techniques. The Times reported that, "CMC, a subsidiary of the American firm Cityscape Financial Corporation, said it would 20
investigate allegations that one of its brokers had carried a machete in his car when visiting clients and others forged clients' signatures or inserted fees after the client had signed the agreement."3 41. On July 15, 1997, The Times reported that six law firms were planning to launch a class action suit on behalf of 1,200 CMC borrowers. It said that attorneys for the class believe that the Company's use of dual rate interest structures and exorbitant redemption penalties are unfair loan practices made illegal by laws introduced three years ago. By this time, a group calling itself the "CMC Victims Association" had been formed, and a "CMC Victim Support Group" had been founded. The article noted that if the High Court does rule in favor of these plaintiffs, this could pave the way for compensation claims from all 30,000 CMC borrowers. 42. On July 18, 1997, after an investigation of the practices of CMC and other subprime lenders operating within the UK, and in an effort to crack down on "deceitful and oppressive" loan practices by such companies, the OFT announced Non-Status Lending Guidelines consistent with its March letter which, among other things, officially made explicit that which was implicit during the Class Period -- that mortgage lenders would not be able to charge substantial penalty interest fees or charge prepayment penalties. The OFT warned that if lenders and/or brokers continued to engage in such practices, it would take regulatory action against them. ____________________ 3 On August 18, 1997, in an effort to discourage media criti- cism, Cityscape announced that it had filed a libel suit against The Times for comments made in its May 25, 1997, issue. 21
Among the practices again condemned by the OFT were (i) dual interest rate structures involving a large differential between the two interest rates and (ii) the Rule of 78's method of calculating prepayments (prepayment penalties would be allowed but only to the extent that they corresponded to the lenders actual costs and expenses associated with a default or early redemption). 43. Also, on July 18, 1997, Parliament member Paul Flynn blasted CMC, calling the Cityscape subsidiary a "mortgage from hell" loan firm. Flynn said of CMC's loan practices: "[CMC] offers a lifeline to people in financial difficulty which turns out to be a noose." Flynn went on to ask the Government to withdraw CMC's credit license and to remove CMC from its list of "right to buy" lenders recommended to council tenants. 44. On July 29, 1997, the London-based newspaper The Independent reported that CMC announced that it was withdrawing its two-tier interest rate plans. According to Company director David Steene, the two-tier rate plans would be replaced by single rate plans. 45. On August 4, 1997, Cityscape shocked Wall Street by announcing disastrous second quarter results. The Company reported net earnings of $3.6 million or $0.08 per share, for the quarter ended June 30, 1997. This compared to $11.1 million or $0.35 per share in the second quarter of 1996, and down from $16.8 million or $0.50 per share for the first quarter of 1997. Results were reduced by two one-time charges, which lowered earnings by a combined $0.44 per share. First, the Company had incurred an 22
after-tax charge of $4.7 million or $0.15 per share, related to the induced conversion of $14 million of the Company's convertible subordinated debentures. Second, in response to the final announ- cement of the Non-Status Lending Guidelines issued by the OFT, which merely made explicit what had been implicit during the Class Period, the Company took a $15 million pre-tax (or $9.1 million post-tax) valuation allowance against gain on sale to augment reserves related to recorded mortgage servicing receivables. Finally, almost five months after being formally notified of problems by the OFT, the Company began to take action regarding its UK loans. 46. On August 7, 1997, as reported in the American Banker, Moody's investment ratings service downgraded Cityscape's debt rating because of the Company's growing number of seriously delinquent loans, and the expected inability of the Company to deal with the rising delinquency rate because of insufficient reserves and the likelihood that future revenues would be cut as a result of UK loan regulation reforms. 47. By August 13, 1997, on heavy trading volume, the price of Cityscape stock had fallen to a 52 week low of $8.625 per share. In an effort to stop the free-fall in its stock price, the Company announced in a press release on that day that it knew of no reason for the unusual trading activity in its stock, adding further that there had been no material changes in its operating results or financial condition since June 30, 1997. In the same August 13 press release it also stated that on August 12, CMC had announced 23
that it "had undertaken a voluntary review of its outstanding UK loans." 48. On August 14, 1997, Money Marketing reported that CMC announced that it was carrying out an internal investigation of its Company and brokers concerning the possibility of malpractice. Cityscape again contended that it was reviewing all UK loans made since 1995 to make sure that it had been fair in its dealings with borrowers. 49. The extent to which defendants had deceived the investing public about the likelihood that its lending practices in the UK were under threat was demonstrated by an August 21, 1997 article in Money Marketing. That article noted that in July, the OFT published guidelines that give companies such as Cityscape "until September to clean up their act. If they fail to, OFT director- general John Bridgeman will seek High Court injunctions to prevent lenders using unfair contracts or strip them of their credit licenses." The article noted that the OFT's actions had "led the biggest player in the market, the City Mortgage Corporation, to abolish its product range 'voluntarily.' CMC also launched an investigation into its operations and its brokers to check for the possibility of malpractice two weeks ago." 50. The August 21 Money Marketing article noted that CMC had received "the most flak from the public and MPs for its dual interest-rate schemes and high charges." It went on to state: CMC offered borrowers, prior to August 1, an initial interest rate of 9.9 per cent which then went up to 16 or 17 per cent (over twice the current bank base rate) if they defaulted 24
on repayments three times. It has now scrapped dual interest rates in line with the OFT's guidelines and introduced a single standard rate of up to 11.9 per cent. CMC's parent company Cityscape UK has put aside $15m for exceptional costs, including the review. UNDISCLOSED ADVERSE INFORMATION 51. The true adverse facts about Cityscape's loan policies and practices and the resultant valuation allowance adjustment due to the modification of late payment and pre-payment interest penalties, were known to and/or recklessly disregarded by defendants. These true adverse facts were in direct contrast to the positive representations made by defendants during the Class Period concerning Cityscape's business operations and practices, its earnings, revenues and net income. These representations were false and misleading and operated to artificially inflate or maintain the market price of Cityscape's common stock during the Class Period. Each of the statements particularized above, made by defendants, as alleged herein, was or became materially false and misleading and misrepresented and/or failed to disclose material adverse information as follows: (a) Defendants failed to disclose the likelihood that it would be forced to change its highly lucrative lending practices in the UK and that this would have a material adverse effect an its existing mortgage loans and require the Company to take substantial additional reserves; (b) Defendants failed to amend valuation allowances and take a sufficient adjustment in reserves for the first quarter of 25
1997, after being notified by the OFT in March of 1997, that practices such as dual rate loans and Rule of 78 prepayment penalties would not be tolerated by British officials; (c) In violation of GAAP (as set forth below) and the Company's own revenue recognition policy, defendants failed to disclose that reported earnings per share and net income in the first quarter of 1997 were materially overstated because a valuation allowance, as required by the March 1997 OFT letter, was not recorded in that quarter. Revenues and earnings for the first quarter were materially false and misleading in that revenue was overstated by $15 million because the Company failed to record as a result of the OFT notice, a $15 million valuation allowance relating to pre-payment and Rule of 78 reforms which resulted in an overstatement in net earnings of $9.7 million after taxes. As a result of the charge not being taken in the first quarter the Company also overstated total revenues, reported at $50 million, by $15 million. Clearly the $15 million and $9.7 million dollar figures were material amounts within the reporting requirements of GAAP, and based on GAAP and the Company's own revenue recognition requirements, the Company had a duty to disclose these amounts and take the reserve in the proper quarter; and (d) Defendants failed to disclose that there was no reasonable basis for defendant Grosser to state on April 24, 1997 that he was confident that the Company's ventures and investments would keep revenue growth strong in 1997, since insufficient reserves and the introduction of new loan products which were going 26
to target higher quality borrowers with lower initiation and prepayment fees, would prevent the Company from achieving profitability and growth in the second fiscal quarter of 1997. 52. The Company's financial statements for the first quarter of 1997, issued during the Class Period over the wire services and in its Form l0-Q filing for the quarter ended March 31, 1997 violated the following provisions of GAAP, among others: (a) The Company's financial statements issued for the quarter ended March 31, 1997 failed to comply with the accounting principle of reliability, which requires that reported information be reliable to the extent that users can depend on it to represent the economic conditions or events that it purports to represent and that such information is reasonably free from error or bias (FASB Statement of Concepts No. 2 and APB Statement No. 4); (b) The Company's financial statements issued for the quarter ended March 31, 1997 failed to comply with the accounting principle of completeness which requires that financial information be complete and that it validly represents the underlying events and conditions (FASB Statement of Concepts No. 2 and APB Statement No. 4); (c) The Company's financial statements issued for the quarter ended March 31, 1997 failed to comply with the accounting principle of conservatism, which requires that a conservative approach be taken in the accounting for transactions and the early recognition of unfavorable events (FASB Statement of Concepts No. 2 and APB Statement No. 4); 27
(d) The Company's financial statements issued during the Class Period failed to comply with the accounting principle of neutrality, which requires that there should be an absence, in reported information, of bias intended to attain a predetermined result (FASB Statement of Concepts No. 2); and (e) The Company's financial statements issued during the Class Period failed to comply with the accounting principle of relevance, which requires that reported information should have the capacity to make a difference in a decision by helping users to from predictions about the outcomes of past, present and future events (FASB Statement of Concepts No. 2). 53. As a result of the disclosure of the truth concerning Cityscape's financial condition and operations, which began on August 4, 1997 and continued through August 13, 1997 with the Company's announced review of all UK loans, the price of Cityscape stock (which had traded as high as $ 31 1/2 per share during the Class Period) closed at $ 10 1/8 per share on August 13. 54. In ignorance of the adverse facts concerning Cityscape's true business and financial condition, which were concealed by defendants, Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class purchased Cityscape common stock at artificially high prices, relying upon the statements made and/or upon the integrity of the market and were damaged thereby. 55. Had Plaintiff and the other members of the Class known of the materially adverse information not disclosed by the defendants, 28
they would not have purchased Cityscape common stock at the artifi- cially inflated prices that they did. FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 10(b) OF THE EXCHANGE ACT AND SEC RULE 10b-5 56. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 55 of the Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 57. During the Class Period, the defendants engaged in a course of conduct, described above, pursuant to which they knowingly or recklessly engaged in acts, transactions, practices, and a course of business which operated as a fraud upon Plaintiff and the other members of the Class; made various untrue statements of material facts and omitted to state material facts necessary to make statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading to Plaintiff and the other Class members; and employed manipulative and deceptive devices and con- trivances in connection with the purchase of Cityscape securities. 58. The purpose and effect of the defendants' plan, scheme, and course of conduct was to artificially inflate the price of Cityscape common stock and then artificially maintain the market price of the stock. 59. The Individual Defendants, through their positions as directors and officers of the Company, had actual knowledge of the material omissions and/or the falsity of the statements set forth above, and intended to deceive Plaintiff and the other members of the Class or, in the alternative, acted with reckless disregard for 29
the truth when they failed or refused to ascertain and disclose in the aforementioned documents the true facts to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 60. Defendants Cityscape and the Individual Defendants had actual knowledge of the material omissions and/or the falsity of the statements set forth above, and intended to deceive Plaintiff and the other members of the Class or, in the alternative, acted with reckless disregard for the truth when they failed or refused to ascertain and disclose in the aforementioned documents the true facts to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 61. The statements made by defendants during the Class Period regarding Cityscape's future outlook, assets, earnings, revenues, reserves and the effect of changes in UK loan policies were materially false and misleading when they were made since, at the time they were made, the defendants were aware, or recklessly disregarded the fact that the Company had grossly under-reported valuation adjustments and reserves. Indeed, the Company's August 4, 1997, announcement of the huge reserves that the Company was going to take lead to a devastating second quarter which could not have surprised defendants, and was not due to circumstances that were unforseen to defendants if they had, as stated, periodically and continuously assessed the value of all assets and necessary reserves. 62. Throughout the Class Period, in knowing and reckless disregard for the truth and/or as part of their common plan and ongoing efforts to continue the illusion of Cityscape's business 30
success, expected substantial profitability and future business prospects, the defendants continued to issue, and/or participated in the issuance of, materially false and misleading statements to the investing public as particularized above. Moreover, defendants failed to correct said statements and omissions when, during the Class Period, defendants knew or were recklessness in not knowing that the statements they previously made or disseminated had become materially false and misleading. 63. Pursuant to their aforesaid plan and scheme defendants made or issued, among others, statements that were materially misleading when made for the reasons set forth above and in that they failed to disclose the aforementioned material, adverse facts about Cityscape's business, financial condition and future business prospects, which were known to and/or recklessly disregarded by defendants. 64. As a result of the foregoing, the market price of Cityscape stock was artificially inflated during the Class Period. In ignorance of the materially false and misleading nature of the misrepresentations, described above, made by defendants and the deceptive and manipulative devices and contrivances employed by the defendants, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class relied, to their detriment, on the integrity of the market price of the stock in purchasing Cityscape stock. Had Plaintiff and the other members of the Class known of the material adverse information not disclosed by the defendants, they would not have purchased Cityscape stock at the artificially inflated prices that they did. 31
65. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have suffer- ed substantial damages as a result of the wrongs alleged herein. 66. By reason of the foregoing, defendants have directly or indirectly violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule l0b- 5 promulgated thereunder, in that they: (a) employed devices, schemes and artifices to defraud; (b) made untrue statements of material fact or omitted to state material facts necessary to make the statements made not misleading; and (c) engaged in acts, practices and a course of business which operated as a fraud or deceit upon Plaintiff and the other members of the Class in connec- tion with their purchases of Cityscape stock during the Class Period. SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 20(a) OF THE EXCHANGE ACT 67. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs 1 through 66, as if set forth fully herein. 68. The Individual Defendants, by virtue of their offices, directorships, and specific acts were, at the time of the wrongs alleged herein, controlling persons of Cityscape within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. The Individual Defendants had the power and influence and exercised the same to cause Cityscape to engage in the illegal conduct and practices complained of herein by causing the Company to disseminate to the public, or through analysts, the materially false and misleading information referred to above. 69. The Individual Defendants' positions made them privy to and provided them with actual knowledge of the material facts con- 32
cealed from Plaintiff and the Class by Cityscape during the Class Period. 70. By reason of the conduct alleged in the First Claim for Relief, the Individual Defendants are liable for the aforesaid wrongful conduct and are liable to the Plaintiff and the members of the Class for the substantial damages which they suffered in connection with their purchases of Cityscape common stock during the Class Period. JURY DEMAND WHEREFORE, Plaintiff on his own behalf, and on behalf of the other members of the Class, pray for judgment as follows: A. Declaring this action to be a proper class action, certifying the Plaintiff as a Class representative and his counsel as Class Counsel; B. Declaring and determining that the defendants violated the federal securities laws by reason of their conduct as alleged herein; C. Awarding money damages against the defendants, jointly and severally, in favor of the Plaintiff and the other members of the Class for all losses and injuries suffered as a result of the acts and transactions complained of herein, together with prejudg- ment interest on all of the aforesaid damages which the Court shall award from the date of said wrongs to the date of judgment herein at a rate the Court shall fix; 33
D. Awarding Plaintiff his costs and expenses incurred in this action, including reasonable attorneys', accountants' and experts' fees; and E. Awarding such other relief as may be just and proper. Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all issues. Dated October 21, 1997. STULL, STULL & BRODY /s/ ________________________ Jules Brody (JB 9151) Mark Levine (ML 0180) Michael A. Swick 6 East 45th Street New York, NY 10017 (212) 687-7230 Steven J. Toll COHEN, MILSTEIN, HAUSFELD & TOLL, P.L.L.C. 1301 Fifth Avenue Suite 2905 Seattle, WA 98101 (206) 521-0080 Mark S. Willis COHEN, MILSTEIN, HAUSFELD & TOLL, P.L.L.C. 1100 New York Avenue, N.W. West Tower, Suite 500 Washington, D.C. 20005-3934 (202) 408-4600 Counsel for Lucian B. Cox, III 34

Source: Scanned paper copy of court-filed document